Beijing is executing its space vision faster than many expected. Since 2021, China completed a space station, lunar sample return, asteroid probe, & more.
@kathleencurlee.bsky.social new CSET blog shows where it has made progress and where it’s still behind.
cset.georgetown.edu/article/chin...
Bottom line: The U.S. can’t afford to sleep on these firms.
They’re building the tech that could define the next decade of space power.
Ignore them, and the U.S. risks ceding ground in the most strategic domain of the century.
There’s also a strategic first-mover advantage.
Countries that integrate commercial SSA, servicing, and lunar logistics early will shape how those capabilities are used, regulated, and secured.
This is not just about business, it’s about space norms and power projection.
Still, there are real openings for industry, government, and allies:
✅ Use public-private models like CLPS and SBIR
✅ Create pathfinder acquisitions for high-risk tech
✅ Update export rules to better align with allies
✅ Leverage these firms in multilateral norms-setting
The report also outlines major barriers facing these firms:
🚫 Export controls restrict dual-use tech transfer
🚫 Public sector crowd-out (e.g. GPS) limits commercial incentives
🚫 Unclear procurement pathways for advanced tech
🚫 High capital costs and unclear ROI
Across all five areas, the report finds:
📈 A surge in company formation around 2021
📍 Many firms clustered around orbital servicing and exploration
The second requires guidance and control to enable precise landings as well as sufficient thermal protection material to survive reentry.
There are at least two primary challenges to in-space manufacturing:
First creating automated processes that can work unattended in the space environment and safely returning the products to Earth.
side note- every time I think of in-space manufacturing, I envision Star Trek's ports in Enterprise
In-space manufacturing is the fabrication of items in space for use in orbit or on Earth. Much of the technology derives from in-space servicing and, to a lesser extent, exploration.
Despite many challenges, companies are forming to address in-space servicing. Founding data shows progress, with about half of all identified servicing companies forming in the last five years, and five out of every six in the past 12 years
In-space satellite services enable novel, sustainable uses of space as well as militarization.
In-space satellite services encompass space-based SSA; debris remediation; satellite life extension; servicing, repair, and refueling; and in-space (postlaunch) transport of satellites.
As NASA has become increasingly willing to engage with commercial entities outside of legacy prime contractors, the industry has responded.
Compared to PNT and SSA, exploration may seem less important, but a failure to maintain leadership in it has strategic risks.
For example, technology spin-offs from exploration provide second-order benefits. Early U.S. dominance in semiconductor manufacturing was driven by the space program
Space is more congested than ever and all of this space “stuff” has to be monitored.
Adding the burden of contested space, where space assets may be targeted by adversaries, only raises the importance of the tracking mission of SSA but again, less than 1 percent work in this area.
While most people have heard of GPS, SSA occurs mostly in the background of American life. Beyond civil uses, SSA also forms the foundation of military space domain awareness
PNT (think: GPS and its alternatives) underpins nearly every civilian and military system, but it’s a soft spot.
Startups are now working on expanding LEO PNT capabilities and jam-resistant alternatives.
Still, fewer than 1 percent of all space companies in our dataset are pursuing PNT missions.
The data shows a surge in company formation around 2021, especially in areas where federal services are still limited.
But without clearer demand signals, through procurement or policy, many of these firms could stall before they scale.
These companies are not always the big space giants we already know.
Many are small firms working on speculative-but-possible tech, sometimes with little government support.
That’s what makes them risky, but strategically essential.
In a new
@csetgeorgetown.bsky.social report, we identify 91 U.S. companies developing advanced space technologies in five areas of innovation: PNT, ground-based SSA, exploration, and in-space satellite services and manufacturing.
What comes next in space after rockets and remote sensing?
A new generation of space companies is working on advanced technologies. But what are they up to?
A 🧵 on the next frontier of space innovation:
The threats are real—but so is the opportunity to shape the future of space through shared leadership.
Read the full piece here:
time.com/7277034/us-a...
Much like #NATO was formed to prevent conflict through collective defense, an Allied Space Forces can help ensure that space remains secure, stable, and open for all.
That’s why Andrew Hanna and I propose an Allied Space Forces—a coalition of democratic nations committed to:
• Coordinating strategy and operations
• Protecting critical infrastructure from hostile actions
• Promoting deterrence and responsible behavior in orbit
The U.S. cannot address this alone, and existing alliances are insufficient to meet these challenges.
Meanwhile, #China is investing across the full spectrum of space capabilities from exploration to counter-space systems, which are backed by a long-term strategy to shape global norms.
#Russia has already demonstrated its willingness to weaponize #space. In 2021, a Russian anti-satellite test created a massive debris field that endangered even its own cosmonauts aboard the #InternationalSpaceStation. Now, it may be considering nuclear-based threats in orbit.
In my latest piece for TIME, I argue it’s time for the U.S. and its allies to respond with a defensive alliance.
Space is now critical terrain—not just for defense, but for the #global #economy.
“We are aware of reports that Russia is examining the possibility of placing nuclear weapons in space.”
— NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, via @politico.com
This is not a theoretical risk—it’s a credible warning that demands a strategic response. 🧵
