@gesineweber
European security & defence, global order, EU in US-China competition. Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich. PhD Defence Studies, King’s College London. Into running, matcha, 中文. Views my own. geopoliticaleurope.substack.com
Italy has been added to the now E4 of major European leaders coordinating on the US/Israel-Iran war. Perhaps a lost opportunity to include Spain, though that would of course have given the exchange a different direction.
Also note the welcoming of Ukrainain anti-drone help:
More cynically, you could say: finally the European allies are showing the US that they are not that useless...
Interesting for two reasons:
- Macron has highlighted that US action is against intl law
- Sanchez (Spain) is against US action = open European division
Timing couldn’t be better, but that’s something that should anyway be on your reading list!
What I’ll be following: what Europeans will do for freedom of navigation, where airport carrier will be deployed, what happens to EU mission ASPIDES.
www.lemonde.fr/internationa...
The message to Europeans: responsibility for European security is not only measured in numbers. Macron explicitly highlighted the need for other states to step up conventional efforts. It’s also an implicit criticism of those pointing out France’s defence spending, which is not at 3.5%.
Why manage expectations? Because it will take time, and because strategic ambiguity will remain a key principle. In other words: you won’t hear a « of course, France will retaliate a nuclear strike against European country X with its strategic nuclear weapons. »
Why good news? Because it’s very explicit now and things really start to move. Reactions from Merz and Tusk show that there is willingness to participate in exercises.
So what does the speech mean for Europe?
In a nutshell: good news - but manage expectations.
And there’s also a message what European partners should (not) do now.
🧵
What has not changed: arms are only strategic but not tactical, decision to use them (reinforced several times) only with the French President.
Already ongoing and to be intensified: dialogue with a group of European allies, namely Germany, Greece, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, + bilateral coordination already ongoing since summer with UK.
Also mentioned the possibility of deployments in Europe, but without any precisions. Speculations already going on.
Another change: Macron speaks of the need for « symmetry » (as nuclear arsenals of adversaries grow) and that France will increase the number of nuclear warheads without giving numbers. Strategic ambiguity strikes again.
For the first time ever, Macron provided a definition of « vital French interests »: while he has previously emphasised that these had a European dimension, this is now an official doctrine. Meaning: France’s security will be at stake when there’s a nuclear attack on a European country.
Here we go: there’s a new concept in the speech - dissuasion avancée, which you can either translate as « advanced deterrence » or, better, forward deterrence.
Another Macron speech, this time on France's nuclear posture, and another concept: dissuasion avancée.
Short summary from me shortly...
Just your regular weekend reminder to disconnect from the news and do things that are good for you.
(Good sunrise season is back in Zurich!)
Europe faces a dilemma in its engagement with China. While closer relations with Beijing could reduce European dependence on the US, it would also annoy Washington.
@gesineweber.bsky.social & Zeno Leoni argue Europe should consider embracing its role as a middle power @lseeuroppblog.bsky.social
In case you missed it...
@fbermingham.bsky.social is doing all China watchers in Europe (and elsewhere) a favour:
Embracing the role of a middle power could help Europe engage with China while mitigating the impact of a harsh response from Donald Trump.
✍ @gesineweber.bsky.social & Zeno Leoni blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2...
German chancellor Merz visits China today. The visit follows Macron's and Starmer's visits in the last months, and comes at a time of transatlantic tensions.
Zeno Leoni and I have written on Europe's Trump-China dilemma for LSE blogs:
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2...
Europe can defend itself without the United States.
@gesineweber.bsky.social and I call on European leaders to overcome their defeatism and nostalgia for a transatlantic past that won't return—and lay out a path to strategic autonomy.
warontherocks.com/2026/02/brea...
Remember when Rutte said Europe should stop dreaming about defending itself?
Moritz Graefrath and I wrote an answer to that claim in @warontherocks.bsky.social.
warontherocks.com/2026/02/brea...
This is your regular reminder to disconnect on the weekend and do things that are good for you.
Below: the only 15min of sun in Zurich this week.
This is becoming interesting...
I wrote a similar piece for @warontherocks.bsky.social almost a year ago - and explain why it's not enough to be right and not enough to give France credit: warontherocks.com/2025/05/its-...
What I like about this piece: it highlights that France - even if it was intellectually right - often did not really walk the walk, for example on defence spending.
www.economist.com/europe/2026/...
What are the takeaways from MSC for Germany, UK, Poland, and France?
@rikefranke.bsky.social, @mtsavill.bsky.social, @susmonika.bsky.social & yours truly:
