Sam Bresnick

Exclusive | China Is Using the Private Sector to Advance Military AI A variety of companies and universities is helping the country’s forces to modernize with cutting-edge technology, data shows.

And thanks to @wsj.com's @joshchin.bsky.social for covering the report this morning!
www.wsj.com/world/china/...

Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion | Center for Security and Emerging Technology China’s efforts to develop AI-related military capabilities have garnered significant interest in the United States. Drawing on 2,857 AI-related defense contract award notices published between Januar...

12/ Read the report here: cset.georgetown.edu/publication/...

11/ The PLA is tapping both legacy defense giants and a rising class of civilian AI innovators. The U.S. must prepare for a more diffuse, harder-to-target Chinese defense industrial base.

10/ While this work covers only a small slice of China’s military procurement landscape, it suggests that China’s military-civil fusion strategy is paying dividends.

9/ For the U.S. and its allies, this complicates research security, export controls, and sanctions. Most of these NTVs/universities are not under U.S. restrictions. Distinguishing between benign and risky ties is harder than ever.

8/ Our findings reveal that the PLA is diversifying its AI supply chain. SOEs still win the highest-value contracts, but NTVs and civilian institutions are making the ecosystem more agile and competitive.

7/ Civilian universities are also in the mix. Tsinghua, Shanghai Jiao Tong, and others won AI contracts with direct military applications, from swarm navigation to targeting software.

6/ One telling example is Flytek Digital (closely linked to iFlytek), which won 20 contracts for AI-enabled speech processing & decision-support algorithms. Other top NTVs include PIESAT (satellites/AI) and Chengdu JOUAV Automation (drones).

5/ Most of the NTVs are young. The majority were founded after 2010, and they specialize in dual-use tech, ranging from drones to data fusion. They see both defense and civilian markets as paths to growth.

4/ BUT nearly ¾ of the suppliers were “nontraditional vendors” (NTVs), or companies with no self-reported state ownership ties. Together, they won 764 contracts, more than SOEs or universities.

3/ We found that legacy defense players lead AI procurement. State-owned giants like CETC, CASC, and NORINCO, as well as defense-linked universities like the “Seven Sons,” remain the backbone of the PLA’s AI procurement.

2/ Between Jan 2023–Dec 2024, the PLA issued 2,857 AI-related contract award notices. 1,560 entities won at least one bid. We zeroed in on the 338 suppliers that won multiple contracts.

1/ 🚨 In a new @csetgeorgetown.bsky.social report, Cole Mcfaul, Daniel Chou, and I examine the inner workings of China’s military-civil fusion strategy and AI defense industrial base. Here’s what we found 🧵

If you read the article, you'd realize we're in fact not arguing China would be able to use Taiwan's fabs to produce chips.

Check out my latest in @lawfaremedia.org with @aidanpowers.bsky.social

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5/ Of course, political considerations will be the most important factor in China's Taiwan calculus, but the semiconductor prowess that once shielded Taipei could become a strategic liability by making it a more tempting target.

4/ Export restrictions have choked off China's access to many of these chips, and China is making progress on mature semiconductors. If Washington’s AI advantage grows too steep, China may feel compelled to act—both to reclaim Taiwan and level the AI playing field.

3/ Complicating matters further is the fact that the U.S.–China AI race is heating up, and Taiwan sits at the heart of it. The world’s most advanced AI models rely on the cutting-edge chips produced in Taiwan.

2/ That dynamic is now shifting. Several geopolitical factors are eroding its protective power, including worsening cross‑strait tensions, China's rapid military modernization, and doubts about U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan, among others.

THREAD: Why Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” might be turning into a target.

1/ For years, Taiwan's dominance in semiconductor production has served as a kind of "silicon shield," a deterrent against Chinese aggression because any conflict could devastate global chip supply chains.

On Lawfare Daily, @jshermcyber.bsky.social spoke to @sambresnick.bsky.social about his recently published report, “Big Tech in Taiwan,” on 17 companies’ Taiwan entanglements, and how greenfield foreign direct investments, data centers, supply chains, and more expose those companies to Taiwan.

America Must Rebuild Its Physical Economy In order to compete with China and boost growth, the United States must better balance the software and hardware components of its economy.

To do this, the U.S. government should work with allies and partners and invest in industries of the future. By integrating world-class hardware with leading software, Washington can fortify its position against global competitors.

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nationalinterest.org/feature/amer...

Rebuilding the “physical economy” isn't about recapturing past glory; it's about creating a resilient ecosystem where advanced hardware and innovative software co-evolve to meet the demands of modern warfare and the global market.

Rebalancing is the challenge at hand. To remain competitive, U.S. policymakers must ensure that innovation in software is matched by strength in hardware.

Future technological breakthroughs, such as AI-powered drones and autonomous vehicles, demand the seamless integration of software with robust hardware production. Without this balance, the U.S. risks falling behind in the global tech competition.

This divergence is critical. U.S. tech giants may create cutting-edge software, but they lack the ability to produce the physical components that power modern innovations. It’s a split that could expose vulnerabilities in both economic and national security.

At the same time, China has become a competitive player in software and AI. TikTok is one of the world's most popular social media platforms, and DeepSeek has emerged as a critical AI developer.

Meanwhile, China has taken a different route. Its strategy? Double down on manufacturing. Chinese-made EVs make up 76 percent of global sales, while DJI controls 90 percent of the consumer drone market. Beijing also dominates in industrial robots.

The US built an economic dynamo by shifting from building tangible products to focusing on software. Yet, this lean towards the digital has left a gap—a diminished capacity for advanced manufacturing in sectors like EVs, drones, and robotics.

America Must Rebuild Its Physical Economy In order to compete with China and boost growth, the United States must better balance the software and hardware components of its economy.

In The National Interest, @jack-corrigan.bsky.social and I argue the US-China tech race will be defined by the integration of advanced software and hardware. US firms lead in AI, but CN companies now dominate emerging hardware. The US risks falling way behind.
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nationalinterest.org/feature/amer...