New article out in Politics & Society with @danieldrisc.com and @maxkiefel.bsky.social : "Internationalizing Industrial Policy: How China and the United States Use State Capacity to Secure Critical Minerals for Electric Vehicles"
journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...
Two major findings this paper offers scholarship
1 - Governance form matters at least as much as capital origin
2 - Durable success for ports that are transshipment hubs depends on anchored hinterland demand & diversified customer portfolios
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To continue competitive neutrality & build on gains while minimizing risks, policy makers should not attempt to reverse integration, instead they should focus on building institutions around Chinese owned ports that fairly distribute gains & maintain system integrity.
11/12
Since the acquisition, Piraeus achieved network improvements & has since experienced increased throughput (especially from larger COSCO ships) and consolidation as one of Europe's premier transshipment hubs. Furthermore, competitive neutrality has been maintained.
10/12
Potential drawbacks from vertically integrated, π¨π³ state owned ports include: decreased competitive neutrality (favoring COSCO, OOCL & other Chinese aligned enterprises), less transparency, downgraded labor relations, less local input for safety & environmental standards.
9/12
Benefits that could come with vertically integrated, Chinese state owned ports include: improved port competitiveness, productivity, connectivity, employment opportunities, fewer capacity restraints & other spillovers.
8/12
Control of major shipping hubs allows states to excercise significant control over global trade operations. Challenges to port governance include mechanisms that maintain competitive neutrality, cyber security, harmonizing overlapping jurisdictions & crisis preparedness.
7/12
Through what economists call βpatient capitalβ, state owned enterprises like COSCO are uniquely more capable than their private sector counterparts of withstanding short term financial set backs to achieve strategic control in the long run.
6/12
Via π¨π³ SOE COSCO, acquisition of the port progressed from the concessions of Piers II & III in 2009 to majority share ownership in 2016. Through initial engagement, π¨π³ port operators acquire knowledge of European port management systems, regulations & logistical operations.
5/12
For the scope of this study, Piraeus is particularly insightful because of its status as a transshipment hub, the magnitude of the change and the full range of possible ownership and governance models.
4/12
Access to the primary Asia-Europe shipping route, proximity to the Suez Canal and connectivity to Balkan & Eastern Mediterranean markets makes Piraeus a highly strategic port for the expansion of Chinas Belt and Road Initiative.
3/12
The European port system is one of the densest in the world with ports that typically follow a standard landlord model. π¨π³ investments & operators have embedded themselves in 3 geographic areas:
1 - Eastern Mediterranean
2 - Western MediterraneanΒ
3 - North Sea & Baltic
2/12
Through an examination of the Piraeus Port acquisition from 2009-2016, Stampoliou Marina assesses the benefits & risks of Chinese investments in European ports and considers policies that could optimize those investments while mitigating the risks.
dione.lib.unipi.gr/xmlui/bitstreaβ¦
1/12
- Boost diplomatic capacity by leveraging international partnerships to access frontier technologies, while negotiating knowledge-sharing and co-development. Diplomatic capacity thus becomes part of state capacity.
8/8
- Create innovation corridors linking SMEs with research hubs
- Establish fiscal incentives for firms investing in lagging regions (territorial cohesion, not metropolitan concentration)
7/8
- Create a Knowledge and Innovation Fund that receives earmarked revenues from extractive industries and deploys them independently of annual budgets.Β
- Decentralize innovation centers to regional universities and technical institutes
6/8
Novoa concludes the paper by making policy recommendations that shift the framing of industrial policy from infant industry support towards mission informed knowledge policy.
- Establishing a National Innovation Council with binding coordination powers
5/8
2 - Cognitive Capacity (Mokyr & Samuelson): cultural legitimacy & stable R&D investment that sustains knowledge accumulation (partial progress)
3 - Ethical Capacity (Sampedro): derived from policy commitments to justice, inclusiveness & human welfare (limited progress)
4/8
1 - Strategic Capacity (Mazzucato, Aghion & Howitt): the ability to articulate and coordinate public missions and institutional learning (the most progress has been achieved here)
3/8
In his paper, he synthesizes the main ideas of their works to develop an evolutionary triangle of development that considers strategic, cognitive & ethical capacities necessary for overcoming the middle innovation trap.
2/8
Rodrigo Barra Novoa applies insights from Mazzucato, Aghion, Howitt, Mokyr, Samuelson & Sampedro to understand Chileβs middle innovation trap and how to better apply industrial strategy to achieve social & economic development.
arxiv.org/abs/2510.20863
1/8
The authors conclude that if managed properly (keep up with public debt & safeguard national sovereignty), Vietnam can reap significant benefits from BRI projects. If this approach is pursued, then Vietnam should be able to leverage BRI opportunities while minimizing risks.
8/8
These experiences paired with alternatives offered by other powers have caused some countries (especially Myanmar & Vietnam) to more seriously pursue alternatives like Indiaβs βAct Eastβ, Japanese investment or Europeβs Connectivity Strategy.
7/8
The variety stems from different sources as the survey shows, but negative impressions can often come from failed/cancelled projects, experienced lack of transparency, social responsibility, lack of local sourcing & disregard for the host culture.Β
6/8
Albana & Fiori (2021) found that the reception of BRI projects in Southeast Asia varied across three clusters
1) Positive: Cambodia, Laos & MyanmarΒ
2) Cautious: Singapore, Thailand & VietnamΒ
3) Skeptical: Indonesia, Malaysia & the Philippines
tinyurl.com/3f24mwv5
5/8
Individual level - the BRI is a central part of realizing Xi Jinpingβs Chinese dream (a strong military, a powerful nation, development, happiness, harmony, peace, cultural advancement, environmental protection & the rule of law).
4/8
National level - the BRI channels Chinaβs desire to maintain its export-led growth model, bridge the inland-coastal wealth disparity, integrate peripheral provinces with the rest of the country, enhance energy security & reduce dependence on the high traffic Malacca Strait.
3/8
International level - the backdrop of the BRI in Southeast Asia arrives at a time when strategic competition between major powers in the region is at a high point as Southeast Asia exists as a significant flashpoint in that competition.
2/8
Tran Xuan Hiep, Nguyen Tang Nghi & Nguyen Cam Tu utilize a foreign policy analysis framework to assess the motivations & driving forces behind how the BRI functions both in SE Asia generally & Vietnam specifically.
tinyurl.com/57yrzpha
1/8
KaraoΔuz, Ayhan & Albasar contend that the developmental state model continues to be valuable (especially in the post-neoliberal era) so long as precise definitions are held, justifications for one definition > another are clarified and rigorous research methods are applied.
7/7
