02.03.2026 18:19
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Governments worldwide turn to age-based access control to Internet services to protect children. More than 370 scientists call for a moratorium until there is a good understanding of their feasibility, effectiveness, and societal impact:
csa-scientist-open-letter.org/ageverif-Feb...
Har vært på leting etter snill, trygg og ikke-amerikansk telefon. Jeg fant ut to ting:
1) At det er umulig å komme helt i mål, og hvorfor
2) Hvorfor det likevel er verdt å forsøke
Håper du vil lese! Artikkelen er også blitt en slags podkast i lydutgaven, et eksperiment, om du heller vil lytte
Have you noticed that digital products and services are getting worse? So have we!
Today we are publishing our new report, Breaking Free: Pathways to a fair technological future. vimeo.com/1168468796?f...
Some accepted papers at IACR Eurocrypt 2026 are now available online: iacr.org/cryptodb/dat...
The call for presentation (3-page extended abstract) deadline is on Wednesday this week, check it out: privcryptworkshop.github.io/cfp.html
Published an opinion piece (in Norwegian) about PQC (yay) vs QKD (buu) in @digi.no today, together with @jonathan.isogeny.club, Kristian Gjøsteen (NTNU), Øyvind Ytrehus (UiB), and Morten Øygarden (UiB): www.digi.no/artikler/deb...
I am very happy to announce that thanks to the hard work of many people (The "MIKE Team"), we now have a working implementation in SageMath of MIKE (Module Isogeny Key Exchange).
A team of computer scientists from the Applied Cryptography Group, including Matteo Scarlata, Professor Kenny Paterson, Giovanni Torrisi and Matilda Backendal, have discovered serious security vulnerabilities in three popular cloud-based password managers.
Read more ⬇️
We are also very excited that Stefano Tessaro @stefanotessaro.bsky.social accepted to give an invited keynote on «anonymous credentials» at the PrivCrypt workshop: homes.cs.washington.edu/~tessaro/
We are very excited to announce that Anja Lehmann will give an invited keynote on «real-world privacy protocols» at the PrivCrypt workshop: hpi.de/lehmann/team...
My colleague Jeongeun Park has an open PhD position in Post-Quantum Cryptography for Privacy Preserving Protocols at NTNU in Trondheim with application deadline March 20: www.jobbnorge.no/en/available...
I am co-organising (with @drl3c7er.bsky.social and Lucjan Hanzlik) a workshop on Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography in Rome on May 10 as an affiliated event to IACR Eurocrypt. Submit your best PEC-work (3-page extended abstract) for presentation by February 25th: privcryptworkshop.github.io
Submission week for the Cryptographic Application Workshop (CAW), an affiliated event at Eurocrypt'26 in Rome! Please submit your talk proposals on constructive real-world crypto using the following instructions before Jan 23, 2026 AoE. All infos on: caw.cryptanalysis.fun.
We're hosting an Autumn School in London, UK, from 15 to 17 September 2026, to bring together ethnographers and cryptographers to discuss ways in which the two fields can be meaningfully brought into conversation. This is also the premise of our Social Foundations of Cryptography project: to ground cryptography in ethnography. Here, we rely on ethnographic methods, rather than our intuition, to surface security notions that we then formalise and sometimes realise using cryptography. Our intention is to 'flip' the typical relationship between the computer and social sciences, where the latter has traditionally ended up in a service role to the former. Rather, we want to put cryptography at the mercy of ethnography. But how do we do this? How do we as cryptographers interact with and make sense of ethnographic field data? How can we refine, improve or extend this interaction? What obstacles do we face when we make cryptography rely on ethnographic data which is inherently 'messy'? How do we handle that cryptographic notions tend to require some form of generalisation but ethnographic findings can only be particular? How do ethnographers retain the richness of ethnographic field data in conversations with cryptographic work? Indeed, our project has already highlighted some limitations of our approach. It has brought to the fore concrete challenges in 'letting the ethnographic data speak' while still making it speak to cryptography. The Autumn School is an opportunity to explore these questions jointly across ethnography and cryptography, through a series of talks, group discussions and activities. We say a bit more about the programme and registration for the Autumn School here.
Social Foundations of Cryptography: Autumn School
London, UK | 15 to 17 September 2026
social-foundations-of-cryptography.gitlab.io/school
Come work with us!
Lecturer (≅ Assistant Professor/Juniorprofessor/Maître de conférences) in Cryptography at King’s College London
martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2026/01/05/l...
Germany has agreed to stop ChatControl for now, due to huge amounts of public pressure. Good job! The bad news is that it could come back as soon as December, and the German government has interpreted the feedback as a need to “moderate” the proposal.
Discord user IDs getting leaked is the entirely predictable consequence of requiring platforms to do age verification. That data never goes away, it spreads. In this case, into appeals in a breached customer support database. And predictably, it can get worse. www.404media.co/the-discord-...
Forhåpentligvis snart!
Ser ut som de er i mot forslaget til slutt: www.patrick-breyer.de/en/citizen-p...
Someone please make me understand how Denmark can be at the same time freaking out about hybrid war with Russia AND pushing for government-mandated spyware as Chat Control.
What is chat control? Good video explainer developed by @carmelatroncoso.bsky.social and team at Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy #chatcontrol www.youtube.com/watch?v=-y2O...
We are alarmed by reports that Germany is on the verge of a catastrophic about-face, reversing its longstanding and principled opposition to the EU’s Chat Control proposal which, if passed, could spell the end of the right to privacy in Europe. signal.org/blog/pdfs/ge...
Ja det høres plausibelt ut
Det burde det ja. Åpenbart eksempel på såkalt "freemium", hvor ting testes gratis, samler inn mye info, og lærer om bruken nå, og så vil det bli big business etterhvert for å beholde tilgang og få benytte avanserte funksjonaliteter.
Interessant, det var eg ikke klar over, og finner heller ikke noe om Chat GPT via UiO når eg søker litt rundt i NTNU sitt intranett...
Abstract. We present Olingo, a framework for threshold lattice signatures that is the first to offer all desired properties for real-world implementations of quantum-secure threshold signatures: small keys and signatures, low communication and round complexity, non-interactive online signing, distributed key generation (DKG), and identifiable abort. Our starting point is the framework of Gur, Katz, and Silde (PQCrypto 2024). We change the underlying signature scheme to Raccoon (Katsumata et al., Crypto 2024), remove the trapdoor commitments, and apply numerous improvements and optimizations to achieve all the above properties. We provide detailed proofs of security for our new framework and present concrete parameters and benchmarks. At the 128-bit security level, for up to 1024 parties and supporting 2⁶⁰ signatures, our scheme has 2.6 KB public keys and 9.7 KB signatures; while signing requires communication of 953 KB per party. Using the LaBRADOR proof system (Beullens and Seiler, Crypto 2023), this can be further reduced to 596 KB. An optimistic non-interactive version of our scheme requires only 83 KB communication per party.
Image showing part 2 of abstract.
Olingo: Threshold Lattice Signatures with DKG and Identifiable Abort (Kamil Doruk Gur, Patrick Hough, Jonathan Katz, Caroline Sandsbråten, Tjerand Silde) ia.cr/2025/1789
In 2023, Signal was the first mainstream messenger to enable post-quantum cryptography. We’re still ahead of the (elliptical) curve, implementing a new hybrid PQ ratchet ensuring Forward Secrecy & Post-Compromise Security even in a post-quantum world. signal.org/blog/spqr/