Not necessarily. For monist panpsychism, the relationship between physical and mental is an identity relationship. In other words, matter is mental.
Not necessarily. For monist panpsychism, the relationship between physical and mental is an identity relationship. In other words, matter is mental.
quantum-level randomness is deliberately raised to the macro level, resulting in the βfree willβ of the organism. Therefore a brain is actually just the opposite of what a machine is.
(I assume βrandomnessβ in the quantum world is actually a kind of βwillβ at a very basic level)
Brain is not a machine because in the design and creation of machines, engineers deliberately prevent unpredictable behavior and randomness. Biological organisms work with just the opposite principle:++
Not that I am convinced of all the hypothesis he brings. But a very good read to be inspired about the possibilities once we go beyond the dogmas of materialism.
Iβve just finished reading Rupert Sheldrakeβs book βThe Science Delusionβ. I am impressed; it is much more inspiring than I expected. Rupert is not only a good scientist, but also a good writer; engages the reader and brings convincing evidences and resources.++
Vajina sΓΆzcΓΌΔΓΌ kullanmaktan Γ§ekinilmiΕ :)
Neticede de, doΔal olan mΔ± normal doΔumdur, yoksa normal olan mΔ± doΔal doΔumdur, karΔ±ΕmΔ±Ε :))
It is hard for me to distinguish this from idealism.
AΓ§Δ±kΓ§a bir darbe ortamΔ± bu..
:(
It might also be possible to assign such unity to other physical things such as atoms as there is also a strong integration there (again, IIT). For other non-living things (like table), having no integrated information, assigning consciousness to the whole is problematic.
What we call "table" is a collection of atoms that we bring together, and the part-whole relationship is brought together in our own minds. But for a living thing, that part-whole relationship is established in a way that we necessarily consider the whole organism to have a unit consciousness. ++
I think IIT might give a good perspective there. For example, "is a table conscious?" sounds like a legitimate question from a panpsychist perspective, but there is a nuance: you can also ask "is the leg of the table conscious?". You can go further: "is this wood fibre in the leg conscious"? ++
Materialism is the only implausible metaphysical viewpoint.
"Without #consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless."
Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?"
Anyone want to come to this? Should be fun.
oxfordliteraryfestival.org/literature-e...
If there happens a voting today, they will vote for Trump again.
Yet similar to black holes having a huge mass which doesn't allow denying their existence, consciousness is primal to us; we cannot say it doesn't exist. So, the existence of consciousness seems a bit paradoxical. But I think it is because the way we define the epistemological space is incomplete.
I think consciousness in epistemological space is similar to the black holes in physical space. Similar to black holes occupying no physical space, consciousness occupies zero epistemological space as knowledge is always on something other than the knower. ++
This is in fact similar to what Federico Faggin defends in his book "Irreducible".
This part is consistent with the quantum physics which assign probabilities to the events, but not predict hard deterministic outcomes. And what comes later, the random outcome of the event (within the probabilities) can be seen as the conscious mind's "free decision within limits". ++
I am not sure if I understand this criticism. We all know that even if we have free will, it is limited. For example I can choose to eat or not, but my body produces signals that signifies hunger which pushes me towards deciding to eat, increasing the probability of that decision. ++
One limitation of this view as explained by Goff (@philipgoff.bsky.social) in his book Galileo's Error is that it is a very minimalistic view: mind only determines the moment of decision. The probability of the decision and the final outcome is purely determined by physical laws and randomness. ++
In short, the argument is that non-physical mind is interacting with the physical brain through "observation" which causes the wave function to collapse, ending the superposition state, which we observe as conscious decisions. ++
There is one exception to this: the observer effect in #quantum physics. Chalmers and McQueen discuss this in terms of dualism in their article " #Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function" (arxiv.org/pdf/2105.02314). ++
The problem with dualism is that, if it was true, we should have seen some anomalous phenomena in the brain that cannot be explained by physical interactions. But so far we did not observe any such anomaly. Rather, we have been able to explain neuronal activity with purely physical interactions. ++
Not in its current form; but maybe if we copy biology:
bsky.app/profile/memt...
This is a huge research path that can be at least partly investigated in empirical ways. And this path might lead to #artificial #consciousness .
With a possibility in our minds that consciousness might be something fundamental which rises to the macro world through biology, and perhaps effecting biology in some ways. ++
Where do we go from this? In my opinion it is the best to return back to biology but in a more humble way. Which means, without the prejudice that we can explain "life" with fully mechanistic and chemical laws. ++
A calculator calculates arithmetic operations without having a subjective experience of those operations. This is similar in the current AI. ++