3/ Deterrence through uncertainty: Using the logic of "surrogate strike," US could wield the distribution of said intelligence akin to devolution of command in nuclear deterrence to create uncertainty for PRC decision making during a crisis.

2/ Deep strike: US-TW Joint Staff work solve the issue of Taiwan having the firepower, but not the real-time C5ISTAR for deep strike against Chinese invasion force on the Chinese mainland.

1/ Blue-on-Blue: Fire coordination center solves the issue of potential US-Taiwan blue-on-blue, making US intervention a more realistic prospect.

Every AAR of Taiwan's HK Exercise by the US said "fix your fire coordination or we ain't coming," no one enjoys blue-on-blue. The new US-TW Fire Coordination Center has many implications, me, @wentisung.bsky.social and Bryce Barros dive into it (cont. in reply)
Link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnUB...

Taiwan rushes to beef up radar and surveillance at sea China's 'gray zone' moves necessitate sharper maritime eyes, officials and experts say

I talked to Nikkei Asia on Taiwan's Coast Guard's concerning Maritime Domain Awareness gap - and the need for a domestic, sensor-fused COCO fixed-wing solution.

asia.nikkei.com/politics/int...

👉Aerial ISR is the most flexible solution.
👉TCG’s UAS efforts failed for the past 10 yrs, unlikely to succeed soon.
👉Fixed-wing assets, operated by private concerns (COCO) with multi-modal sensors and onboard information fusion represent the most efficient solution at present.

For the Center for Maritime Strategy, me and Director Fu Mei looked into Taiwan’s Maritime Domain Awareness gap:
👉 Making up the gap erodes military’ combat readiness.
👉 Gap allows Chinese infiltration
👉 Gap endangers search and rescue (SAR) efforts
(Cont. in reply)
Full article: shorturl.at/7fdPY

The Taiwanese president's proposal to hike defense spending faces gridlock at home Opposition parties are slamming the brakes on billions in defense funding as the China escalates military pressure.

I talked to NPR on Taiwans' deadlocked defense bill; and why it's dangerous to be so focused on the number and passage of the bill to the exclusion of the substance of the bill, that Taiwan's defense policy space urgently require more transparency.

www.npr.org/2026/01/22/n...

2/ This also has implication for US and allied forces; the Chinese "eye in the sky" above would necessitate US Marine MLRs, the "stand-in" force deployed within adversary WEZ without US air power, to carry special munitions such as AMRAAM-ER to counter high altitude threats.

Shrinking the Strait: How Drone Warfare and Hybrid Tactics are Erasing Taiwan’s Strategic Depth | Global Taiwan Institute The 100 mile-wide Taiwan Strait has long served as the ultimate guarantor of Taiwan’s security. For decades, the sheer geographic challenge of crossing that barrier has reinforced a sense of strategic...

1/ Eric Chan at Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) just published a timely piece, including how Russia exploit drone warfare to disrupt European airspace operation, protect its shadow fleet tankers, and how China will adopt these tactics against Taiwan. Report: globaltaiwan.org/2026/01/shri...

China flies drone into Taiwan’s airspace for first time Surveillance flight over disputed atoll highlights Beijing’s growing aerial capabilities

I talked to FT on Chinese HALE drone violating Taiwan airspace near Pratas Island at high altitude, where Taiwan didn't have system capable of intercept. This is an escalation allowing China to establish precedence and inch closer to war. (cont. in reply)
www.ft.com/content/4b73...

4. Exotic capabilities such as “RF-enabled cyber effects” by the latest Compass Call EA-37Bs are less significant than great intel and meticulous and robust OPLAN/OPORD/ATO.

3. Venezuelan air defense posture was a mistake – and Taiwan should adopt an asymmetric air defense posture aimed at exacting PLAAF attrition.

2. US “secret weapon” is the meticulous planning process; this means contingencies with OPLAN in place, such as OPLAN 5077 for Taiwan, has greater deterrence against the adversary.

1. JYL-27A’s range error (2-5km) and poor angular resolution means you need highly coordinated capabilities to follow-up, including GCI, Venezuela clear does not have this; China however does.

Great to discuss Venezuelan IADS, Chinese VHF radar, and US op planning with Tony Hu, Fmr Sen. Director, China Mongolia Taiwan Office, DoD, and Guermantes Lailari, USAF LtCol (Ret.). Hopefully I made the following points clear (in reply):
Link: youtube.com/watch?v=0X7m...

Beijing pressures Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners. Here's what the US should do in response Taiwan’s shrinking circle of diplomatic partners plays a crucial role in deterring Chinese coercion, and the United States needs a more targeted strategy to help preserve this support and maintain cro...

Full report: www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-res...

In this Taiwan Talk episode hosted by Atlantic Council GCH Fellow @wentisung.bsky.social, me and DSG Peifen Hsieh of TaiwanICDF discussed our latest report (link in reply) on Taiwan's diplomatic partners, their significance to deterrence, and the role US can play.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=PnyT...

A year end stern cross-strait warning Podcast 單集・Taiwan This Week・2026/01/02・52 分鐘

I join Taiwan ICRT's podcast this week, hosted by Gavin Phipps, along with Michale Fahey and Ralph Jennings to talk about China's Justice Mission exercise and Taiwan's recent military acquisition and defense reform.
podcasts.apple.com/tw/podcast/a...

A year end stern cross-strait warning Podcast 單集・Taiwan This Week・2026/01/02・52 分鐘

I join Taiwan ICRT's podcast this week, I join Taiwan ICRT's podcast this week, hosted by Gavin Phipps, with Michale Fahey and Ralph Jennings to talk about China's Justice Mission exercise and Taiwan's recent military acquisition and defense reforms.

podcasts.apple.com/tw/podcast/a...

I talked to Al Jazeera on Taiwan's 11.1 Billion arms buy. The most significant item is the Taiwan Mission Network(TMN), alog with the Tactical Awareness Kit (TAK) this enables common operational picture (COP), critical for decentralized mission-type tactics (Auftragstaktik).

youtu.be/GUPxDk-Ct8A

Beijing pressures Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners. Here's what the US should do in response Taiwan’s shrinking circle of diplomatic partners plays a crucial role in deterring Chinese coercion, and the United States needs a more targeted strategy to help preserve this support and maintain cro...

Full report: www.atlanticcouncil.org/.../maintain...

駐美副代表姜森：台灣邦交國對台美具戰略重要性 | 政治 | 中央社 CNA 駐美副代表姜森今天在華府智庫「大西洋理事會」台灣研討會指出，台灣邦交國對台海穩定貢獻很大，對台灣與美國都很重要，都具有戰略重要性。

Honored to be picked up by CNA on our latest report. Taiwan's diplo partners form a critical part of deterrence, as information dominance is the prequisite for PLA invasion of Taiwan. US/TW can do much to strengthen deterrence while helping allies.

www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/20...

China's next aircraft carrier could be nuclear-powered—What to know Recent imagery suggests China is developing its first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, while the U.S. operates 11 such vessels.

I talked to Newsweek on PLAN's future posture, China's strategic goals for its carriers, how Taiwan fits in, and the difficulty for PLAN to scale its nuclear pipeline.

www.newsweek.com/chinas-next-...

3/ "Reunification." For an article talking about ignoring Chinese intent, it sure knows how to regurgitate Chinese propoganda - Taiwan was never part of the PRC, any person with sensitivity in the field would know to avoid using thi

2/ c) From what we know, both the USG and Taiwan are pretty aware of what China's most likely playbooks are - that's why the entire focus for the US effort to strengthen Taiwan has shifted to resilience and the ability for military and civilian authorities to work together.

2/ b) Some operational TTX/simulation, or even mission level ones assume Chinese strikes because that was part of the many contingencies - and those are the ones on the harder end, so the intent was to test those. This has nothing to do with how "likely" this scenario may be.

2/ The big takeaway seemed to be that China will use coercive tactics to induce a Taiwan surrender without striking US bases first - this is a strawman argument:

a) Exploring Chinese intent really benefit little from a non-descript wargame setting without knowing the contextual constraints.

A Wargame to Take Taiwan, from China’s Perspective In August 2025, 25 international experts gathered at Syracuse University to do something unusual: plan China's invasion of Taiwan. For two days,

Classic example of why wargame should be read with caution:

1/ Without the aim, structure, and player roles, funder and organizer of the game, it's hard to separate artefacts of gameism, biases from organzier and funding, to judge the validity of observations.

warontherocks.com/2025/10/a-wa...

The awesome Kitsch discussing wargames on China-Taiwan
www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnWC...