Eyal Ronen's Avatar

Eyal Ronen

@eyalr0

Researching applied cryptography and security. School of Computer Science at Tel Aviv University. https://eyalro.net

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18.12.2024
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Latest posts by Eyal Ronen @eyalr0

Next up, 'Encryption in the microarchitectural world', presented by Ping-Lun Wang

#realworldcrypto

09.03.2026 09:49 πŸ‘ 3 πŸ” 1 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0
Tamarin prover: Home

Very proud and grateful to have won the 2026 #realworldcrypto Levchin prize together with David Basin, Jannik Dreier, and Ralf Sasse for our work on the Tamarin Prover (tamarin-prover.com), as well as having the amazing opportunity to give a keynote at RWC! Hope you enjoyed it! #realworldcrypto2026

09.03.2026 09:43 πŸ‘ 17 πŸ” 3 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 1
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Huge congrats to the Tamarin Team on winning the Levchin Prize for the Tamarin prover, and its use in the analysis of real-world security protocols. #realworldcrypto2026

09.03.2026 03:23 πŸ‘ 18 πŸ” 4 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0
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She Came Out of the Bathroom Naked, Employee Says Bank details, sex and naked people who seem unaware they are being recorded. Behind Meta’s new smart glasses lies a hidden workforce, uneasy about peering into the most intimate parts of other people’...

The data from your Meta Ray Bans is used to train Meta's AI, which most people don't understand means that humans are looking at the most intimate details of their lives. www.svd.se/a/K8nrV4/met...

04.03.2026 06:47 πŸ‘ 406 πŸ” 263 πŸ’¬ 11 πŸ“Œ 24

The Lebanese, Iranians, Israelis, and all the rest of the people in the Middle East deserve much better. I hope that we will be smart and strong enough to bring peace and prosperity to everyone here.

03.03.2026 16:08 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0
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Introducing Signal Secure Backups In the past, if you broke or lost your phone, your Signal message history was gone. This has been a challenge for people whose most important conversations happen on Signal. Think family photos, sweet...

Until now, if you lost or broke your phone, your Signal message history was *gone,* a real challenge for everyone whose most important conversations happen in Signal. So, with careful design and development, we’re rolling out opt-in secure backups.

signal.org/blog/introducing-secure-backups

08.09.2025 16:02 πŸ‘ 701 πŸ” 210 πŸ’¬ 19 πŸ“Œ 39
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The EU wants to decrypt your private data by 2030 The EU Commission unveiled the first step in its security strategy to ensure "lawful and effective" law enforcement access to data

This battle will keep playing out over and over again until they achieve something that their own citizens have made it clear they don’t want. www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-priv...

05.07.2025 17:39 πŸ‘ 95 πŸ” 43 πŸ’¬ 3 πŸ“Œ 6
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Commission presents Roadmap for effective and lawful access to data for law enforcement The European Commission presented today a Roadmap setting out the way forward to ensure law enforcement authorities in the EU have effective and lawful access to data.

Well, this horrible idea refuses to die so we should refuse to let it pass and start organizing again.

ec.europa.eu/commission/p...

05.07.2025 17:25 πŸ‘ 75 πŸ” 42 πŸ’¬ 2 πŸ“Œ 5

If any Iron Maiden fans are in the Birmingham area tomorrow (the 21st), I have a couple of Premier Lounge tickets that I unfortunately can't use due to the current situation.
#IronMaiden #RunForYourLivesWorldTour #IronMaiden50
@ironmaiden.bsky.social

20.06.2025 07:57 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 2 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0
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On the Virtues of Information Security in the UK Climate Movement Our paper – titled β€œOn the Virtues of Information Security in the UK Climate Movement” – was accepted at USENIX Security’25. Here’s the abstract: We report on an ethnographic study with members of …

New blog post on our (with @rikkebjerg.bsky.social and @mikaelabrough.bsky.social) USENIX'25 paper "On the Virtues of Information Security in the UK Climate Movement" where I end up reflecting on writing this, for me, unusual work.

martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2025/06/14/o...

14.06.2025 14:27 πŸ‘ 2 πŸ” 2 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

I think that papers paper award is better

07.06.2025 16:44 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0
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After a long debate about whether this small typo was worth resubmitting the PDF or not, @IEEESSP 's server stopped responding one minute before the deadline and solved it for us.

06.06.2025 12:17 πŸ‘ 4 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0
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Self-nomination for the Artifact Evaluation Committee of NDSS 2026 We are looking for members of the Artifact Evaluation Committee (AEC) of NDSS 2026. The Network and Distributed System Security symposium adopts an Artifact Evaluation (AE) process allowing authors t...

All papers should publish their code. Help realize this by becoming an artifact reviewer at NDSS'26, apply here: docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F...

You'll review artifacts of accepted papers. We especially encourage junior/senior PhD students & PostDocs to help. Distinguished reviews will get awards!

25.05.2025 13:25 πŸ‘ 12 πŸ” 10 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 1
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uASC 2026 will take place on February 3, 2026, in Leuven, Belgium, hosted by KU Leuven. We can't wait to see you next year!

Cycle 1 Paper Submission Deadline is July 15, 2025!
πŸ‘‰ uasc.cc #uasc26

19.05.2025 15:58 πŸ‘ 10 πŸ” 9 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0
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New version of the IEEE 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi was has been released. A total of 5969 pages!

The number of pages clearly keeps increasing. That includes more features to defend networks, but also more features to potentially abuse πŸ‘€

07.05.2025 22:28 πŸ‘ 10 πŸ” 5 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

Bradley Morgan, Gal Horowitz, Sioli O'Connell, Stephan van Schaik, Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup, Daniel Genkin, Olaf Maennel, Paul Montague, Eyal Ronen, Yuval Yarom
Slice+Slice Baby: Generating Last-Level Cache Eviction Sets in the Blink of an Eye
https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.11208

16.04.2025 04:09 πŸ‘ 2 πŸ” 2 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0
IACR Fellows

Congratulations to the new IACR fellows....

Joan Daemen,
Thomas Johansson,
Anna Lysyanskaya,
Pascal Paillier,
J.R. Rao,
Alon Rosen,
Elaine Shi,
Bo-Yin Yang.

iacr.org/fellows/

#cryptography

14.04.2025 18:16 πŸ‘ 35 πŸ” 11 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 1

Taking this trans day of visibility as a moment to say I am loudly and unapologetically in support of trans rights. πŸ³οΈβ€βš§οΈ

31.03.2025 17:04 πŸ‘ 43 πŸ” 9 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 1
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FOSS infrastructure is under attack by AI companies LLM scrapers are taking down FOSS projects' infrastructure, and it's getting worse.

If you’re a FOSS project dealing with overwhelming AI scraper bots, we will provide free security services for your project at no cost to you ❀️ #TeamSleep thelibre.news/foss-infrast...

20.03.2025 15:18 πŸ‘ 87 πŸ” 33 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 3
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Congratulations to the legendary Adi Shamir on his Levchin Prize win! Dr. Shamir donated the $10K prize money to students sponsorships.

26.03.2025 09:16 πŸ‘ 13 πŸ” 7 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 1
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Now we have Adi Shamir's invited talk on 'How to Securely Implement Cryptography in Deep Neural Networks'

eprint.iacr.org/2025/288.pdf

#realworldcrypto

26.03.2025 09:29 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 1 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0
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The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans U.S. national-security leaders included me in a group chat about upcoming military strikes in Yemen. I didn’t think it could be real. Then the bombs started falling.

In 25 years of covering national security, I’ve never seen a story like this: Senior Trump officials discussed planning for the U.S. attack on Yemen in a Signal group--and inadvertently added the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic. www.theatlantic.com/politics/arc...

24.03.2025 16:11 πŸ‘ 16621 πŸ” 6491 πŸ’¬ 787 πŸ“Œ 2587

*Friends don’t let friends deploy a cryptographic protocol without a formal cryptographic analysis* martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2025/03/16/a... @kennyog.bsky.social @eyalr0.bsky.social @lenka.sh

16.03.2025 11:37 πŸ‘ 13 πŸ” 1 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

It’s finally out - our 107-page analysis of key exchange in Telegram in which we proved (after massive effort) that the bespoke protocol is ok, if you’re willing to make some uncomfy assumptions on the home-grown KDF. With @malb.bsky.social, @eyalr0.bsky.social, Lenka MarekovΓ‘ and Igors Stepanovs.

11.03.2025 17:19 πŸ‘ 42 πŸ” 10 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 1
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Certificate Apocalypse: Bringing Your Chromecast Back from the Dead Learn how to fix your Chromecast 2 that stopped working on March 9, 2025 due to an expired certificate. Simple workarounds for both regular and factory-reset devices until Google releases an official ...

mensfeld.pl/2025/03/brin...

Certificates are hard

11.03.2025 16:13 πŸ‘ 0 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0
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RWC 2025 program Real World Crypto Symposium

The tentative program for Real World Crypto 2025 is live!

rwc.iacr.org/2025/program...

A huge thanks to my co-chair @malb.bsky.social and all the amazing program committee members for helping put this together. I'm looking forward to seeing everyone in Sofia!

#realworldcrypto

19.02.2025 12:25 πŸ‘ 14 πŸ” 9 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 2

Well, I guess that privilege escalation is considered woke now.

10.02.2025 16:45 πŸ‘ 2 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0

Because of new tariffs, submissions to crypto with a non US author have a 20% reduction to their page limit.

04.02.2025 05:48 πŸ‘ 21 πŸ” 5 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 1
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RWC 2025 accepted papers Real World Crypto Symposium

The list of accepted talk at @rwc.iacr.org is now available: rwc.iacr.org/2025/accepte... Early registration ends 26 February. CC: programme co-chair @nicksullivan.org

02.02.2025 12:14 πŸ‘ 29 πŸ” 17 πŸ’¬ 3 πŸ“Œ 1
Abstract. The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transform is a prolific and powerful technique for compiling public-coin interactive protocols into non-interactive ones. Roughly speaking, the idea is to replace the random coins of the verifier with the evaluations of a complex hash function.

The FS transform is known to be sound in the random oracle model (i.e., when the hash function is modeled as a totally random function). However, when instantiating the random oracle using a concrete hash function, there are examples of protocols in which the transformation is not sound. So far all of these examples have been contrived protocols that were specifically designed to fail.

In this work we show such an attack for a standard and popular interactive succinct argument, based on the GKR protocol, for verifying the correctness of a non-determinstic bounded-depth computation. For every choice of FS hash function, we show that a corresponding instantiation of this protocol, which was been widely studied in the literature and used also in practice, is not (adaptively) sound when compiled with the FS transform. Specifically, we construct an explicit circuit for which we can generate an accepting proof for a false statement.

We further extend our attack and show that for every circuit C and desired output y, we can construct a functionally equivalent circuit C^(*), for which we can produce an accepting proof that C^(*) outputs y (regardless of whether or not this statement is true). This demonstrates that any security guarantee (if such exists) would have to depend on the specific implementation of the circuit C, rather than just its functionality.

Lastly, we also demonstrate versions of the attack that violate non-adaptive soundness of the protocol – that is, we generate an attacking circuit that is independent of the underlying cryptographic objects. However, these versions are either less practical (as the attacking circuit has very large depth) or make some additional (reasonable) assumptions on the underlying cryptographic primitives.

Abstract. The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transform is a prolific and powerful technique for compiling public-coin interactive protocols into non-interactive ones. Roughly speaking, the idea is to replace the random coins of the verifier with the evaluations of a complex hash function. The FS transform is known to be sound in the random oracle model (i.e., when the hash function is modeled as a totally random function). However, when instantiating the random oracle using a concrete hash function, there are examples of protocols in which the transformation is not sound. So far all of these examples have been contrived protocols that were specifically designed to fail. In this work we show such an attack for a standard and popular interactive succinct argument, based on the GKR protocol, for verifying the correctness of a non-determinstic bounded-depth computation. For every choice of FS hash function, we show that a corresponding instantiation of this protocol, which was been widely studied in the literature and used also in practice, is not (adaptively) sound when compiled with the FS transform. Specifically, we construct an explicit circuit for which we can generate an accepting proof for a false statement. We further extend our attack and show that for every circuit C and desired output y, we can construct a functionally equivalent circuit C^(*), for which we can produce an accepting proof that C^(*) outputs y (regardless of whether or not this statement is true). This demonstrates that any security guarantee (if such exists) would have to depend on the specific implementation of the circuit C, rather than just its functionality. Lastly, we also demonstrate versions of the attack that violate non-adaptive soundness of the protocol – that is, we generate an attacking circuit that is independent of the underlying cryptographic objects. However, these versions are either less practical (as the attacking circuit has very large depth) or make some additional (reasonable) assumptions on the underlying cryptographic primitives.

Image showing part 2 of abstract.

Image showing part 2 of abstract.

How to Prove False Statements: Practical Attacks on Fiat-Shamir (Dmitry Khovratovich, Ron D. Rothblum, Lev Soukhanov) ia.cr/2025/118

27.01.2025 01:58 πŸ‘ 38 πŸ” 17 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 6