but how many precision weapons and interceptors can be fired on days two, 20, and 200, and how quickly industry can replace them. This turns a battlefield question into an industrial one, and an industrial one into a minerals-and-processing question."
foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/05/i...
"The broader point is that the West’s theory of military readiness is incomplete. As the long conflict in Ukraine has already illustrated, war is being costed in the wrong units. The relevant metric is not merely how many launchers there are at the start of the war,
Good plan, there’s no way that the US would ever betray Kurds who fought on their behalf, or that Turkey would be upset by and seek to frustrate any US-backed Kurdish forces, or that an invasion from Iraq would trigger Iranian nationalist opposition. None of those things have ever happened.
The gap that's opened up between the military capacity of the United States (unmatched in human history) and its political and diplomatic capacity (none) is frightening
elites to negotiate the political future from a position of institutional strength rather than exposed vulnerability. In Tehran, continuity is the strategy."
time.com/7381954/iran...
"These dynamics explain why the Islamic Republic has not appeared leaderless, despite losing the man who was, for decades, its most powerful figure. The system’s immediate objective is to preserve coherence—buying enough time for
Tweet on X by Amir Kiyae reads: Strikes on Iran appear to have hit the home where opposition leaders Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard have been held under house arrest - both are reported safe, but their residence was damaged. Former President Ahmadineiad's home was also targeted. Israel has stated it is targeting Iranian leaders "past, present, and future." This follows previous Israeli strikes on Evin Prison. Draw your own conclusions,
Home of reformist opposition leaders from 2009 Green Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard was also hit by Israeli/US strikes. They have been under house arrest by the regime for over a decade.
Some immediate thoughts on possible implications of the current US/Israel-Iran war for Turkey:
1) For Turkey, the security and economic risks of a prolonged war are significant. These include rising energy prices amid ongoing domestic economic fragility, potential declines in tourism revenues,
The trouble is, the long-term cost of giving up on Art 2(4) of the UN Charter may be even higher."
www.justsecurity.org/132773/us-ir...
And for the European Union, with an aggressive Russia on its doorstep and a defense system that will take many years to wean itself off U.S. dependency, the costs of standing up for the UN Charter at this moment are high.
"In the face of Trump’s wide-ranging threats and actions against any who oppose him (tariffs, territorial seizure, invasion and leadership abduction), it is hardly surprising that States like Canada might pull their punches.
The war on Iran likely brings a new oil price shock and windfall profits.
So, who stands to win?
Our research shows: Last time around (2022), the US reaped the largest fossil fuel profits of any country ($377bn). 50% went to the top 1%, only 1% to the bottom 50%. A🧵
This is a real source of anxiety for the regime in Turkey. It didn't start with Iran but the situation in Iran amplifies it.
Interesting.
One way to think about this, like Ukraine, is that Turkey's main geopolitical asset is its geography--which is also its main geopolitical weakness
Thread 👇🏾👇🏾👇🏾
Excellent and comprehensive thread about the implications for Turkey 👇
👌Very sharp overview of how close the US/Israel-Iran war hits NATO member and thawing EU candidate Turkey. Energy, security, regional leverage - this matters far beyond the region. Curious to see her deeper take on what it means for #TürkiyeEU relations. #EurSky 🇪🇺 #iran
7) Ultimately, the trajectory of Turkey–Israel competition - or accommodation - may become a defining variable not only for the evolving regional order, but also for Turkey’s domestic political trajectory. External geopolitical alignments and internal regime debates are increasingly intertwined. END
He framed Turkey as a key actor in any emerging regional order, linking this vision to a Gaza ceasefire, renewed momentum behind the Abraham Accords (potentially including Syria), and improved Turkish–Israeli relations.
6) Washington appears to understand well the importance of a functional TR–ISR relationship. In an interview with Anadolu Agency, Tom Barrack emphasised the need for deeper U.S.–Turkey strategic coordination in shaping a post-war regional architecture.
See the piece at the link here: generalyoavgallant.substack.com/p/the-next-s....
Interestingly, Turkey’s foreign minister has recently indicated that Ankara would be open to repairing ties with Israel, provided there is meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue.
Reflecting this concern, former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has publicly argued for reconsidering the strategic logic of the bilateral relationship within a more structured “spheres of influence” framework.
If the Iranian regime were to undergo serious destabilisation, Turkey–Israel competition would likely assume greater regional significance.
At the same time, Turkey and Israel have demonstrated a capacity to manage friction pragmatically, including through deconfliction mechanisms in Syria.
Israel, by contrast, has often preferred fragmented or decentralised neighbouring environments that limit the emergence of hostile centralised power structures. Recent tensions over developments in the Horn of Africa illustrate these diverging approaches.
Despite the similarities in the logic underlying their threat perceptions, the two countries appear to favour different regional orders. Turkey generally supports strong central authorities and political inclusion of Sunni actors in post-conflict settings.
Conversely, Turkey has deepened coordination with Arab and Gulf states - especially Saudi Arabia - while recalibrating its regional posture amid Iran’s relative weakening and the absence of a political resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
Israeli officials increasingly view Turkey as an unpredictable actor, particularly in light of Ankara’s support for Hamas and political backing of Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated movements.
Although Turkey and Israel enjoyed close defence and intelligence cooperation in the 1990s, mutual trust has eroded significantly since the late 2000s.
