www.nytimes.com/2025/11/06/c...
on.ft.com/4orSmgL
07.11.2025 07:36
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Once more: The incoherence of the Trump administration should not be confused with incapacity. Trump inherited structures of incomparable global power and is unencumbered by calculations of consequence.
This power may dissipate, but the costs in the interim will be immense.
Reupping this article from February — because nothing has changed.
Putin is still being allowed to fight at the table for what he can’t win on the ground.
Trump is still pursuing normalisation at the expense of Ukraine.
Europe is still prostrate.
www.newstatesman.com/world/europe...
Looking for a way to shore up a foundering autocratic regime? Try this:
www.nytimes.com/2025/10/15/u...
Get better analysis of the Russian economy than Trump does. Tune into Sasha & Sasha at The Bell.
pro.thebell.io/webinar_sept...
The list of countries that have moved to outlaw Soros and the Open Society Foundations is long.
Oddly enough, it does not include any democracies.
Remember when the anti-immigrant MAGA base went to war against Elon and Vivek over visas? Looks like they found a compromise. on.ft.com/4nisPq2
Hey New York! Come hang out on Thursday at @nyujordancenter.bsky.social!
harriman.columbia.edu/event/10-yea...
In this view of the world, there is no room for people endowed with free will and inalienable rights. There is only room for humanoid furniture, animatronics whose function is to soothe the aesthetic senses of those who believe that true power—even in a republic—is inherited.
So, the party of limited government, strict constitutional originalism and free markets is now lining up for federal troops in cities, government-imposed censorship in education and state ownership of major corporations.
Shocking, but not surprising, I suppose.
A genuinely productive negotiating process will be a complicated and protracted one. But if Trump doesn’t have the patience for that kind of process, or if Putin is able to maneuver him into impatience, Europe will have to push back.
/END
The Trump-led process is predicated on the notion that security can be had without accountability. That may be true for America across the ocean, so that is doubtful. If Europeans are to own their own security, however, they will have to draw their own conclusions.
/10
Meanwhile, even as everyone is talking about security guarantees and “land swaps”, note what we’re not talking about: reparations, accountability for war, crimes, and dealing with the fact that Russia is bent on military dominion in its neighborhood.
/9
Europe and Ukraine will also need to decide what genuine security looks like. They will not trust assurances from Moscow, and they may be learning that they can’t trust assurances from Washington either.
/8
A cease-fire or any other agreement, whether it involves a land swap or not, requires scrupulous attention to detail. In other words, it requires someone other than the current American top team to do the negotiating. But that’s only half the problem.
/7
There is no inherent reason why a cease-fire cannot be reached in Ukraine, and Trump may be even deserves some credit for creating a process that brings that forward. But if Europe wants a cease-fire that delivers genuine security, it may have to run the process from here.
/6
If Zelenskyy and his European allies all go home and leave the ball in the Trump/Putin side of the court, the best outcome they can hope for is more confusion.
/5
Trump has once again shown himself to be malleable, putting some kind of security guarantees, and even a return to discussion of a cease-fire back on the table. Who knows what will happen when he gets off the phone with Putin later today.
/4
The apocalyptic scenario—another blowup in the Oval Office—was avoided, and that’s good. But the second worst possible outcome was that the European leaders who accompany Zelenskyy would breathe a sigh of relief, and I’m afraid that may be what we’re seeing.
/3
First things first: if we’ve learned anything thus far, it’s that we should give it 12-18 hours before drawing conclusions about anything involving Trump and Putin. Not that that will stop anybody.
Thus, my way too early take is that … I’m nervous.
/2
For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built.
A quick thread
/1
As we wait: the morning after the day before and before the day after
tldrussia.substack.com/p/tldrussia-...
Looking ahead to tomorrow’s US-Ukraine-Europe meeting in the White House, for @npr.org
www.npr.org/2025/08/17/n...
Most of us had assumed, I think, that the Anchorage summit ended early because the sides couldn’t agree on much.
Turns out Putin just decided to quit while he was ahead.
The ball is now in Europe’s court.
Ok, so this tweet didn’t age well. The piece did, though:
“Reversing this trajectory will require … a commitment to the near-term reduction of European dependence on US decision-making, while simultaneously building credible deterrence against Moscow.”
As expected, Trump and Putin leave Anchorage adrift. As I wrote Thursday for @cepa.org, the question now is as it has long been: can Europe take charge?
cepa.org/article/unmo...
Maybe — just maybe — we could accept that Labour have done the analysis and know what they’re doing?
Because nothing will ever seem like enough.
"The risk is not that Europe overreaches, but that it undershoots. Europe will never have all the resources it needs to assure itself of victory. Failing to go to diplomatic war with the army it has, however, assures it of defeat."
My two cents ahead of Anchorage for @cepa.org
Yeah, but if she recognizes that she’s not going to out-Jenrick Jenrick, then there’s little to be gained. Just as there’s little profit in Jenrick trying to out-Farage Farage.