@markparkeryoung
Principal analyst at Google's Threat Intelligence Group. Former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. Views my own. https://markparkeryoung.net
of the CMC as an institution is very uncertain. We shouldn't assume that it will return to the same role it played previously. This is from my November piece on the political and operational fallout from purges -- I think it holds up well:
markparkeryoung.substack.com/p/a-central-...
Until I'm able to write about the latest PLA purges, I've updated this chart showing the CMC's span of control during Xi's tenure.
His reorganizations stretched the CMC and then his purges broke it. It was a fundamentally different organization even before the latest purge, and now the future
I posted a machine translation of recently-released footage of the trial of Xu Qinxian, the 38th Group Army Commander who balked at orders to use force in 1989. The footage provides new insight into a crucial episode in the history of China and the CCP.
markparkeryoung.substack.com/p/the-trial-...
Xi's military purges and reorganizations have reinforced his control over the PLA at the expense of its operational capabilities. I wrote about the new Central Military Commission and what it indicates about Xi's priorities and willingness to use force:
markparkeryoung.substack.com/p/a-central-...
The underlying CNCERT report explicitly references Triangulation and lists alleged IOCs: mp.weixin.qq.com/s/XPjT0BVOJP...
I would strongly recommend Jonathon Sine's review essay on Breakneck, which is itself a brilliant analysis of China: www.cogitations.co/p/litigation...
and secondarily his much shorter review of Apple in China: x.com/JonathonPSin...
(no, these were not paid endorsements, they're just great! ๐)
Delighted that Joseph Torigian (@josephtorigian.bsky.social) will be joining us in Glasgow for
our Scottish Centre for China Research seminar series.
Join us! Wed 8 Oct 4pm UK time
To join online register via link at:
www.gla.ac.uk/research/az/...
It's a testament to the intensity of recent PLA purges that another wave came and went with little attention from English-langauge media, but the latest moves show the depth of disarray engulfing the high command. My take on what the latest moves mean:
markparkeryoung.net/posts/fresh-...
Hello everyone, I am now also on Substack. Bit of an experiment for me, but I suspect people who follow me might like that format better: substack.com/@dakekang
@jonathonpsine.bsky.social has written an absolutely phenomenal review of Dan Wang's "Breakneck." This is one of my favorite single essays about China today.
www.cogitations.co/p/litigation...
Fun to work with Jon Czin on this for Foreign Affairs:
"The moves demonstrate his continued dissatisfaction with the PLAโs high command and can be seen as part of an ongoing process of achieving his larger goals of bending the military to his will."
x.com/BrookingsFP/...
Both parts of this ChinaTalk interview are well worth listening to - deep insights on the nature of the system that remains very relevant today.
My own thoughts from April on the latest purges: markparkeryoung.net/posts/turmoi...
considerations that are only fully understood by the top leader."
Xi Jinping was masterful at calibrating the scope and scale of purges between 2012-17 as he consolidated power. The latest round of purges has seemed more haphazard, although less dangerous for Xi than those of his first five years.
This two part interview about Xi Zhongxun is a fantastic vantage point on elite politics in China. One point by Joseph that is as true today as ever:
"...how far a purge goes, whoโs included in the purge, [and] how the purge is characterized, is an art form that is shaped by a myriad of different
Facing U.S. tariffs, Chinaโs exports to the U.S. are downโwhile exports to Southeast Asia are up. Is that trade diversion and potential transshipment? My estimate: at most 34% of the increased PRC exports to SE Asia in Q2 could reflect trade diverted from the United States.
I look forward to reading it
I was going to write something about why certain types of "Xi Jinping is facing pushback" rumors are fundamentally flawed, but it's basically covered in the "faulty factionalism" section of this essay from a couple years ago:
asiasociety.org/policy-insti...
I wouldn't be surprised if it also gets taken down from the Internet Archive.
I get a 404 error when trying to access the story. Internet Archive version here: web.archive.org/web/20250420...
China's military high command is in the midst of extraordinary upheaval, and Xi Jinping has purged half the uniformed members of the Central Military Commission little more than two years after choosing them. My deep dive on why it's happening and what it means:
markparkeryoung.net/posts/turmoi...
I would interpret the US tariff exemptions primarily as an attempt to mitigate the impact on electronics and consumers more than as a signal of a US-China deal. The exempted categories cover about 22% of US imports from China. content.govdelivery.com/bulletins/gd...
but I think there's also a substantial risk of misinterpretation.
I appreciated the careful nuance in the reporting, which relayed the fact that Wang's comments were "indirect and somewhat ambiguous." It would've been easy to gloss over that.
functional as opposed to regional departments are also more likely to generate misinterpretations of political dynamics from participants on both sides, IMO.
It's certainly possible that there may have been a change in Beijing's talking points about Volt Typhoon that was reflected in this dialogue,
this specific channel as a particularly important one. Wang is a mid-level official at MFA, and the fact that he was leading the dialog (with no mention of representation from the PLA), suggests China was mostly going through the motions on cyber issues. Diplomatic engagements led by
This is an interesting account of how Volt Typhoon came up in a bilateral cyber dialog. I would be wary of assuming that Wang's comments here reflected a high level decision in Beijing to signal Washington.
I'm a bit skeptical because Beijing probably did not view
www.wsj.com/politics/nat...
Was getting a spike in traffic on the other site for this simple tool, so reposting here. In case you have a need for maps like these...
www.mapspam.net/MetOrtho.html
Good context here on South China Morning Post science and technology reporting, which helped spark concern about this patent:
www.pekingnology.com/p/some-troub...
Excellent indictment of science reporting at South China Morning Post by @zichen.bsky.social. My approach is to read SCMP reporting on Chinese politics, even given the severe constraints on it, but disregard all science reports, including on cybersecurity.
www.pekingnology.com/p/some-troub...
Which US industries are most exposed to the China market? Looking at US majority-owned foreign affiliates, the answer is wholesale trade, computers & electronics, chemicals & pharma, autos, and semiconductors. This could matter for US-China talks and potential PRC retaliation to US tariffs.
Taiwan is nervous. With good reason. Jude Blanchette and I discuss in our new RAND Commentary. www.rand.org/pubs/comment...