Russia is carefully balancing its Middle East relationships and avoiding confrontation with the US, calculating that a prolonged crisis could benefit Moscow by diverting Western focus from Ukraine and boosting oil revenues
New briefing note 📑 nestcentre.org/war-in-the-m...
Join Nathalie Tocci in conversation with John Lough about Russia's uses of hybrid warfare tactics in Italy and what Italy’s experience means for broader European exposure and resilience
March 13 | 12:30 GMT | Online
Register at: zoom.us/webinar/regi...
The recording of this morning's mid-week briefing is now on Youtube 🎥
Nikita Smagin joined John Lough to discuss 'The limits of Russian support in Iran' ➡️ youtu.be/k1QRb8FAMpE?...
This is post 3/6 in the highlights series from our latest report on Russia-China relations
Read full report here: nestcentre.org/marriage-without-love
East Siberia and Russian Far East — As a result of western sanctions, Russia’s economy has pivoted to China. Moscow’s growing dependence on trade with China heightens Russian anxieties about long‑term Chinese goals in the east of the country
Global South / Africa — Both states challenge Western influence, but play different roles: China focuses on infrastructure, trade, and a managed transformation of the global order, while Russia uses security tools, political disruption, and anti‑Western rhetoric
Northeast Asia — Russia’s increased military cooperation with North Korea has not met with enthusiasm in Beijing. It wants to avoid excessive strengthening of Pyongyang’s military capabilities
Central Asia — Russia retains political and security influence, but China’s economic footprint has grown rapidly and is re-shaping the region to Beijing’s advantage
Europe — China does not want Russia to be defeated in Ukraine, yet it has no interest in the destabilisation of Europe (a major trade partner). It does not want the war to end with the defeat of Ukraine. China also has the potential to be a major player in the reconstruction of Ukraine
The Arctic — China has invested in Russian Arctic energy projects and uses Russia’s Northern Sea Route to advance its role as a “near‑Arctic state,” while Moscow insists on tight control over that shipping corridor. Their views on Arctic governance diverge, but are managed pragmatically for now
The US — Putin’s overtures to Trump reflect Moscow’s desire to dilute its growing dependence on China. Beijing is unconcerned for now, but Russian flirtations with Washington could quietly test trust in the partnership
There is much more to the Russia–China relationship than meets the eye. It plays out across multiple regions of the world – sometimes in cooperation, sometimes in competition, and often combining the two. Our recent report maps where interests align and where they diverge 🧵
War-driven growth contrasts with civilian stagnation, while rouble appreciation and falling oil revenues threaten the federal budget and reserves in 2026.
Read the short analysis from Sergey Aleksashenko: 'Key rate, rouble appreciation, and fiscal risks in 2026' ⤵️ nestcentre.org/key-rate-rou...
What explains Moscow's cautious response to the latest Middle East escalation? Join Nikita Smigan and John Lough during this week's briefing to discuss.
"The limits of Russian Support in Iran"
Thursday, 5 March | 16:00 CET | Online
Register: zoom.us/webinar/regi...
In February, NEST Centre's Founder Mikhail Khodorkovsky warned of escalating efforts to designate the Russian Anti-War Committee as “terrorist” and to outlaw its work.
Yesterday, Russia’s Supreme Court did exactly that.
Read the Op-Ed ⤵️ www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/02...
The Kremlin fails to protect allies: Assad, Maduro, and now Ali Khamenei. While Moscow wants to reinforce its positions in the Global South as a country that can challenge US influence where needed, its actions do not match its words. The message is clear: Russia is not a reliable ally.
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Avoiding confrontation with Washington is central to Russian calculations. This reflects both limited capacity and a deliberate choice at a time when preserving diplomatic channels with the US over Ukraine remains a priority.
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However, if tensions in the Strait of Hormuz ease within a few weeks, the fiscal effect would be marginal.
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Russia’s fiscal upside depends on the duration of the oil price rise. If higher oil prices are sustained for 3–6 months and Russian crude reaches around $60 per barrel, additional revenues could amount to up to 1.5% of GDP on an annualised basis.
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The Kremlin is unlikely to provide substantial military backing to Tehran. Under the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, Russia and Iran are not obliged to defend one another; their only formal commitment in the event of war is not to side with the adversary.
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From the Kremlin’s perspective, war in the Middle East cuts both ways. US involvement shifts attention and resources from Ukraine, creating openings for Russia. But a wider conflict could destabilise a region where Moscow has key political, economic and military interests.
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For the second time in a year, Moscow has stopped short of stepping in at a critical moment for Tehran.
Why? And what does this tell us about the Kremlin’s priorities? 🧵
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Join the NEST Centre for a discussion with Nathalie Tocci on how Russian hybrid warfare, disinformation and propaganda tactics operate in Italy and what this meansfor broader European exposure and resilience
March 13 | 12:30 (GMT) | London
Register to attend: www.addevent.com/event/kc1f3r...
After four years of war, Russia has hardened into a more personalist and repressive system, adjusted its economy to prolonged confrontation, and signalled readiness for a sustained standoff with the West
New briefing note available on our website ➡️ nestcentre.org/russia-after...
On March 5 at 11:00 a.m. ET, NEST Centre & Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center host a virtual event examining Sino-Russian ties, their impact on Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific, and what they mean for U.S. strategy.
Register: www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/how-sh...
On the sidelines of the @munsecconf.bsky.social, @libmod.de hosted a joint event with @nestcentre.bsky.social about the Russia-China relationship. With Bobo Lo, Sergei Aleksashenko, John Lough, @jankaoertel.bsky.social and @fuecks.bsky.social 1/2
The recording of this morning's mid-week briefing is now available on our youtube. Watch the discussion 'Four years of war in Ukraine: Costs, consequences, and calculations,' now 🎥 ➡️ youtu.be/4daq4jJMdCg
"Russian dictators don’t last long past the incumbent’s age of 73. Whether by age, incapacitation or insurrection, he will soon be gone," writes Mikhail Khodorkovsky, NEST Centre's Founder.
Read his latest in The Telegraph: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/02...
Mikhail Kasyanov, former Prime Minister of Russia, joins John Lough, NEST Centre’s Head of Foreign Policy, to take stock of the war four years on, assess its impact on Russia’s state and society, and discuss the military, economic, and political pressures shaping Moscow’s decision-making.
Join this week's NEST Centre briefing, "Four years of war in Ukraine: Costs, consequences, and calculations"
26 February 2026 | 16:00 CEST (10:00 EST) | Online
Register at zoom.us/webinar/regi...
