The strongest statement in support of the attacks from the Caucasus was from Georgia's former president and the de facto leader of the opposition:
01.03.2026 14:21
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The strongest statement in support of the attacks from the Caucasus was from Georgia's former president and the de facto leader of the opposition:
In Georgia, the only Caucasus country that doesn't border Iran, the stakes are a bit lower. But it has cordial relations with Iran and is eager to build ties with Trump after a falling out with the Biden administration. Its statement was the blandest:
The Azerbaijani MFA statement also notably emphasized "the importance of respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all states."
There also is a very large ethnic Azerbaijan minority in Iran, and some Iran hawks have long sought to instrumentalize them to undermine Tehran. But serious instability in Iran could result in huge refugee flows that would be very difficult for Baku to manage.
Azerbaijan's MFA issued a statement expressing "deep concern" at the "military escalation," urged "all parties involved to exercise maximum restraint and avoid actions that could further inflame tensions, and to return to the negotiation table." mfa.gov.az/en/news/no05...
Iran's defense minister visited Azerbaijan just days before Vance. War in Iran is even more delicate for Baku, a close partner of Israel. Last year, Iran accused Azerbaijan of letting Israel use its airspace to launch drone attacks. (Baku denied.) aze.media/irans-defens...
Papikyan reportedly promised that βArmenia will never be the source or origin of any threat to its historical neighbor and it believes that Iranβs stability guarantees the stability of the region." (But that is Iran's readout, Armenia's was terser.) www.azatutyun.am/a/33687094.h...
But around the visit, there was a flurry of visits between Tehran and Yerevan, as well as between Tehran and Baku. Most remarkably, Armenia's defense minister Suren Papikyan visited Iran just four days before the war started.
Notably, J.D. Vance visited the Caucasus less than three weeks ago. Iran certainly was part of the agenda, but they didn't talk about it in public.
www.crisisgroup.org/anb/europe-c...
Since the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, Iran has become a critical security partner for Armenia. But Iran got alarmed by Trump's intervention into the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, in particular a transport route to be built by an American company right on the Iran-Armenia border.
Iran's closest partner in the region is Armenia; its security council held a meeting last night and "expressed deep regret over the tragic events that have occurred, offered condolences to the victims, and emphasized the need for peace to be established." news.am/eng/news/933...
A lot of understandable caution and concern in the Caucasus this weekend, as neighboring Iran is attacked by the U.S. and Israel. All three countries here are making different strategic calculations, but the bottom line is all want good relations with both Iran and the U.S.
ποΈ NEW ANALYSTβS NOTEBOOK | Vance Visit Reaffirms U.S. Push to End Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict
@joshuakucera.bsky.social weighs up the significance of the U.S. vice presidentβs trip for the peace process and geopolitics in the Caucasus
www.crisisgroup.org/anb/europe-c...
As always, @laurencebroers.bsky.social has essential reading for understanding and framing the dramatic events happening in Armenia and Azerbaijan: www.agos.com.tr/en/news/old-...
And if you missed it, I spoke about this all last week on the
@crisisgroup.org War & Peace podcast: www.crisisgroup.org/europe-centr...
And it's all fed into broader political tensions between the refugees and the Armenian government, which is holding the refugees at a distance as it navigates difficult diplomatic negotiations with Azerbaijan and a high-stakes election next year.
Cuts in government programs to help the Karabakh refugees pay for housing are resulting in hardships this winter. Many are leaving Armenia as a result, mostly to Russia.
Our new commentary at @crisisgroup.org looks at political tension in Armenia around the refugees who fled Karabakh a bit more than two years ago. www.crisisgroup.org/europe-centr...
I'm on the @CrisisGroup War & Peace podcast talking about our new publication (coming soon!) on Karabakh refugees and the political tensions around them in Armenia.
www.crisisgroup.org/europe-centr...
What Trump did was give both sides (but more importantly Azerbaijan) more incentive to have the political will to carry out the concrete steps that they agreed on in principle. That hasnβt happened yet but the White House meeting improved the atmosphere a lot and Iβm more optimistic than not.
Does all this mean space is being created where itβs possible for the two sides to find some compromise on the constitution, and avert the looming disaster that the referendum could pose? Letβs hope.
The two deputy PMs in charge of a joint border commission, also for the first time, crossed into each otherβs territory during a visit along the border last week, the two sides announced. And now Turkeyβs envoy to Armenia will come to Armenia in the coming days.
The August White House meeting has already improved the atmosphere and there have been some small but significant steps forward just in the last few days. Pashinyanβs plane crossed Azerbaijani airspace, reportedly a first.
There is hope that the prospect of becoming a hub, or other potential peace dividends, could convince Baku to delink the constitution issue from the peace process. (Which it already did last year with another critical issue, the βZangezur Corridor.)
The U.S. is promising to help build the βTrump Route,β basically a version of what Azerbaijanis had been calling the Zangezur Corridor, a route through Armenia connecting the two noncontiguous parts of Azerbaijan. That could then open the door to many other regional connections.
Armenia has its own regional hub vision, which is compatible with Azerbaijanβs, called the Crossroads of Peace. There also is interest from abroad in making all this happen β from the EU, Gulf states, and now most notably the U.S.
And that vision is not compatible with an unresolved conflict on its border. Officials in Baku acknowledge that Armenia has to be included if the Caucasus can really become a serious international hub, and that the investors needed to make this happen wonβt come without peace.
But there also is another strain of thinking in Baku, one that is focused on turning the country into a transit and energy hub of the Greater Caspian region. It is something you increasingly see in the rhetoric of Aliyev and state-affiliated commentators.
In the broader context, many in Azerbaijan feel that a peace deal will benefit Armenia more than them, and that the status quo of no war, no peace, is acceptable to Baku. So, in this thinking, they can afford to wait, and as the winners of the war, dictate terms on Armenia.
In Baku, they say thatβs not the case: they consider it a reasonable demand for the Armenian constitution not to enshrine a formal claim on their territory, and want the Armenian public to confirm that they renounce irredentist demands for the sake of long-term peace.