Christian List

Consciousness reveals there's no single objective world <p><em>Does reality contain only physical things? Or could everything be conscious, as panpsychists claim? Philosopher Christian List argues it’s time to move beyond both sides of this debate. Conscio...

The manuscript of my @iai.tv opinion piece on why science as we know it can't explain consciousness is now also on Philpapers at: philpapers.org/archive/LISW...

Consciousness reveals there's no single objective world <p><em>Does reality contain only physical things? Or could everything be conscious, as panpsychists claim? Philosopher Christian List argues it’s time to move beyond both sides of this debate. Conscio...

The manuscript of my @iai.tv opinion piece on why science as we know it can't explain consciousness is now also on Philpapers at: philpapers.org/archive/LISW...

Robert E. Goodin & Christian List, A conditional defense of plurality rule: generalizing May's theorem in a restricted informational environment - PhilPapers May's theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule uniquely satisfies four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited in support of majorit...

Another older paper presents an axiomatic characterization of plurality rule, generalizing May's theorem about majority voting. Interestingly, if the balloting format allows each voter to vote for more than one candidate, then approval voting, not plurality-rule, is supported by similar conditions.

John Dryzek & Christian List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation - PhilPapers The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstr...

And a second older paper: philpapers.org/rec/LISSCT-2.

Christian List, What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response - PhilPapers The most prominent argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. I offer a new diagnosis of what is wrong with this argument. Proponents .....

I'll be uploading on Philpapers the preprints/manuscripts of some older papers, for continuing green open access, beginning with this one: philpapers.org/rec/LISXWW

New on the Archive:

DeBrota, John B. and List, Christian (2026) A Heptalemma for Quantum Mechanics. [Preprint]

https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/27977/

Newly published: "Interview with Christian List", in Catherine Herfeld (@cherfeld.bsky.social), Conversations on Rational Choice, @universitypress.cambridge.org, 2025, philpapers.org/archive/LISI...

Conversations on Rational Choice Cambridge Core - Economic Thought, Philosophy and Methodology - Conversations on Rational Choice

🔥 My book Conversations on Rational Choice is finally out: Conversation partners include Kenneth Arrow, Gary Becker, C. Bicchieri, D. Kahneman, P. Suppes, Christian List, Vernon Smith, Tom Schelling, L.A.Paul, C. Camerer, Martin Shubik, R. Kranton, and many others. www.cambridge.org/core/books/c...

Zeev Goldschmidt & Christian List, Moral uncertainty resolution as belief binarization: An impossibility result - PhilPapers What action-guiding judgments should we rely on in cases of moral uncertainty, when we divide our credence among competing moral views and assign credences between 0 and 1 to propositions such ...

What action-guiding judgments should we rely on in cases of moral uncertainty? We show that the problem of moral uncertainty resolution can be modelled as a belief-binarization problem: how to arrive at all-out (“accept/reject”) judgments on some propositions based on our credences in them.

Zeev Goldschmidt & Christian List, Moral uncertainty resolution as belief binarization: An impossibility result - PhilPapers What action-guiding judgments should we rely on in cases of moral uncertainty, when we divide our credence among competing moral views and assign credences between 0 and 1 to propositions such ...

What action-guiding judgments should we rely on in cases of moral uncertainty? We show that the problem of moral uncertainty resolution can be modelled as a belief-binarization problem: how to arrive at all-out (“accept/reject”) judgments on some propositions based on our credences in them.

John B. DeBrota & Christian List, A Heptalemma for Quantum Mechanics - PhilPapers We present a seven-pronged no-go result for quantum mechanics: a “heptalemma”. It shows that seven initially plausible theses about physical reality are jointly inconsistent with the predictions of qu...

We present a seven-pronged no-go result for quantum mechanics (QM). Seven initially plausible theses about physical reality are jointly inconsistent with QM, while any six are consistent. Different interpretations of QM can then be taxonomized in terms of which theses they retain and which not.

John B. DeBrota & Christian List, A Heptalemma for Quantum Mechanics - PhilPapers We present a seven-pronged no-go result for quantum mechanics: a “heptalemma”. It shows that seven initially plausible theses about physical reality are jointly inconsistent with the predictions of qu...

We present a seven-pronged no-go result for quantum mechanics (QM). Seven initially plausible theses about physical reality are jointly inconsistent with QM, while any six are consistent. Different interpretations of QM can then be taxonomized in terms of which theses they retain and which not.

Master in Logic and Philosophy of Science Our Master (MA) program in Logic and Philosophy of Science was founded in October 2012. It is an international MA program of the Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Studies at L...

The 2026 application round for the MA in Logic and Philosophy of Science at @lmumuenchen.bsky.social is now open. Please help us spread the word. www.philosophie.lmu.de/en/study/deg...

Do group agents have free will? It is common to ascribe agency to some organized collectives, such as corporations, courts, and states, and to treat them as loci of responsibility, over and above their individual members. But sin...

The criteria for free will in AI systems are similar to those for free will in corporate agents. The key question is whether the kinds of non-biological entities that increasingly play decision-making roles in society (whether corporate or AI) should be viewed as intentional agents with free will.

Can AI systems have free will? - Synthese While there has been much discussion of whether AI systems could function as moral agents or acquire sentience, there has been very little discussion of whether AI systems could have free will. I sket...

Can AI systems have free will? - das fragt unser Mitglied
@clist.bsky.social im folgenden #OpenAccess - Artikel:

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

#KI #AI #KuenstlicheIntelligenz #ArtificialIntelligence #FreierWille #FreeWill #Philosophy #Philosophie

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence - Philosophy & Technology The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a ...

Here is a broader discussion of the parallels between corporate agency and AI. Both involve non-human goal-directed agents that affect the social world, often in high-stakes settings, and so they raise similar moral and regulatory challenges, which we must address for the sake of protecting humans.

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence - Philosophy & Technology The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a ...

Here is a broader discussion of the parallels between corporate agency and AI. Both involve non-human goal-directed agents that affect the social world, often in high-stakes settings, and so they raise similar moral and regulatory challenges, which we must address for the sake of protecting humans.

Do group agents have free will? It is common to ascribe agency to some organized collectives, such as corporations, courts, and states, and to treat them as loci of responsibility, over and above their individual members. But sin...

The criteria for free will in AI systems are similar to those for free will in corporate agents. The key question is whether the kinds of non-biological entities that increasingly play decision-making roles in society (whether corporate or AI) should be viewed as intentional agents with free will.

Sebastian Bender I am an Assistant Professor (a tenure track "Juniorprofessor") at the Philosophy Department of University of Göttingen. Before coming to Göttingen, I held positions at Humboldt University in Berlin (w...

Thrilled to announce that Sebastian Bender is joining LMU Munich as Professor of Early Modern Philosophy. His expertise in 17th-18th c. metaphysics & epistemology (Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant) will boost our History of Philosophy section. Welcome, Sebastian! sebastianbender.net

Does free will exist? | Christian List | TEDxTUM YouTube video by TEDx Talks

Here is a repost of a talk on the picture of free will that lies in the background. Free will, I argue, requires intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control. Free will is a multiply realizable capacity, which can occur not only in biological agents but also in artificial ones.

Can AI systems have free will? - Synthese While there has been much discussion of whether AI systems could function as moral agents or acquire sentience, there has been very little discussion of whether AI systems could have free will. I sket...

To determine whether an AI system has free will, we shouldn't look for any mysterious property, ask if the system is unpredictable, or expect its algorithms to be indeterministic. We should ask: are there explanatory reasons to view the system as a choice-making agent with alternative possibilities?

Can AI systems have free will? - Synthese While there has been much discussion of whether AI systems could function as moral agents or acquire sentience, there has been very little discussion of whether AI systems could have free will. I sket...

To determine whether an AI system has free will, we shouldn't look for any mysterious property, ask if the system is unpredictable, or expect its algorithms to be indeterministic. We should ask: are there explanatory reasons to view the system as a choice-making agent with alternative possibilities?

Can AI systems have free will? - Synthese While there has been much discussion of whether AI systems could function as moral agents or acquire sentience, there has been very little discussion of whether AI systems could have free will. I sket...

Here is now the published version: doi.org/10.1007/s112...

Another summer read from the MCMP.

Now forthcoming in Synthese: "Can AI systems have free will?", preprint available at: philsci-archive.pitt.edu/26166/3/Free...

From why-why-why to global justice Political philosopher Laura Valentini asks fundamental questions about human coexistence. Now she is receiving the Princess Therese of Bavaria Prize.

From why-why-why to global justice: LMU philosopher Laura Valentini asks fundamental questions about human coexistence. www.lmu.de/en/newsroom/...

Feeling what others feel In a world battered by crises, what does empathy really mean? An interview with philosopher Monika Betzler on empathy and morality.

Feeling what others feel: In a world battered by crises, what does empathy really mean? An interview with philosopher Monika Betzler on empathy and morality.
www.lmu.de/en/newsroom/...

Winners of Princess Therese of Bavaria Prize 2025 This year, the Princess Therese of Bavaria Foundation has recognized outstanding female researchers from the spheres of culture and the humanities at LMU.

LMU philosophers Prof. Monika Betzler and Prof. Laura Valentini have each been awarded a Princess Therese of Bavaria Prize 2025. www.lmu.de/en/newsroom/...

At this year's MCMP Summer School, we had wonderful lectures by Professors Francesca Boccuni (San Raffaele), Hilary Greaves (Oxford), and Alyssa Ney (LMU). Many thanks to our speakers and especially to the fabulous participants from all over the world! www.mathsummer.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de

A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness Abstract. In this paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims—namely ‘first-pers

Recently published: "A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness", by Christian List, Philosophical Quarterly, 2025, academic.oup.com/pq/article/7...