Make sure to check other articles in the special issue! They introduce 1) the drivers of public opinion toward IOs, 2) the effect of public opinion on IOs, and 3) the influence of IOs on pubic opinion.
Our work is part of the RIO’s special issue "Public Opinion and International Organizations," edited by @lisadellmuth.bsky.social & @jonastallberg.bsky.social.
The results suggest that transparency could empower international bureaucrats to tackle divisive issues in times of member-state gridlock. @supolisci.bsky.social
Our analysis at the country-year level shows that the reform led to greater national newspaper coverage of the WTO TRIPS, which in turn raised public awareness.
Using network statistics to estimate the state preference distributions on key topics, we find that, after the reform, the WTO Secretariat is more likely to issue reports on polarized topics in negotiations, using accountability-enhancing words.
We assess these competing perspectives by analyzing the World Trade Organization’s 2002 document de-restriction reform that enhanced transparency to the public.
Existing theories offer opposing expectations—greater transparency might induce international bureaucrats to engage more with contentious issues that matter to the public or lead them to avoid those issues whenever possible.
How does transparency affect the behavior of international bureaucrats tasked with facilitating negotiations? In new work with Sojun Park in the Review of International Organizations (doi.org/10.1007/s115..., it’s open access!), we provide an answer in the context of the WTO.
We’re here to Hype that Hypothesis! Today we look at @minjulisettekim.bsky.social and @bobbygulotty.bsky.social's work on " #Electoral #Rewards and #Punishments for #Compensation.” Read about their three-step approach to explore their hypothesis: doi.org/10.1353/wp.2...
@jkertzer.bsky.social, @ericmin.bsky.social, Tyler Jost, Robert Schub, @doncasler.bsky.social, @rickyclark.bsky.social, @noahzucker.com, @mirkoheinzel.bsky.social, Kate Weaver, and more.
Our paper shows that bureaucrats as individuals can shape foreign policy outcomes, which is in dialogue with fascinating work on bureaucratic politics in IR. Have a close look at the work by Shannon Carcelli, @lindsayrdolan.bsky.social, @sabrinabarias.bsky.social, @svanhildur.bsky.social,
There is a ton of great work on ambassadors (by @mattmalis.bsky.social @calvin-thrall.bsky.social, Ahmed Faisal, David Lindsey, Eric Arias, Alastair Smith, Michael Goldfien). However, we know much less about how the export promotion benefits created by ambassadors are distributed domestically.
The home-state effect is particularly apparent in countries where the US exports the most in dollar values, and in industries that export final goods. We find that the past career path and future career aspirations of ambassadors can shape how the benefits of diplomacy are distributed domestically.
Leveraging the biographic information of 164 ambassadors and US state-level exports to 30 major export destinations from 2002 to 2020, we find that the home states of politician ambassadors, compared to other states, on average enjoy a 10 percentage point increase in exports to host countries.
In the United States, a substantial number of ambassadors are former governors or legislators (“politician ambassadors"). We argue that politician ambassadors are particularly equipped with knowledge and incentives to promote exports from their home states to host countries.
My ambassador paper with Shu Fu is out in @worldpolitics.bsky.social!
Ambassadors promote domestic exports to a host country and represent the interests of their home country at large. However, are trade benefits equally distributed domestically? 🧵
muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/articl...
