What to make of the EU decision on funding for Ukraine? It is a good outcome in my opinion. Here is why:
@eulaliarubio
Senior Research Fellow at institutdelors.eu, Paris, senior associate at ceps.eu, Brussels Interested in all issues related with the EU budget and EU's public finances, from how to spend it to how to pay for it
What to make of the EU decision on funding for Ukraine? It is a good outcome in my opinion. Here is why:
So what the hell just happened? Two things: Ukraine will get 90 billion euros. And Orbán did not veto that even though he could have.
How so? Short thread:
super interesting thread Lucas! but in fact given that it´s a guarantee and that the only real cost in the short/medium term will be the coverage of debt servicing, the compensation to the three countries must be minimal isnt it?
Still lots to digest from the #MFF proposal, but with the colleagues from @delorsberlin.bsky.social we crunched the numbers, shared views & came up with a joint assessment and recommendations on how to move on,
Check out this great summary by @nilsredeker.bsky.social 👇
@delorsinstitute.bsky.social
The budget numbers proposed by the EU COM are finally out - but their interpretation is far from unequivocal. Let me give you some comparisons in 2025 prices which is more informative in terms of actual buying power:
Mes premières impressions sur la proposition CPF: Une proposition courageuse, mais qui émane d'une Commission politiquement affaiblie, qui pourrait avoir du mal à faire accepter des changements qui accroissent ses propres pouvoirs.
institutdelors.eu/publications...
My first throughts on the #MFF proposal: A courageous proposal — but it comes from a politically weakened Commission, which may struggle to secure buy-in for changes that increase its own powers. The real test starts now.
institutdelors.eu/en/publicati...
Here below some interesting findings from a first preliminary comparison between the current MFF and the post 2028-2034 MFF proposal by my colleague @romyha.bsky.social from the Delors centre of Berlin - with all the caveats in mind, as we still do not have the real figures !
Totally agree with @paolatamma.bsky.social ,today's presentation of the MFF proposal has been catastrophic: delays, simultaneous presentation of the proposal at the Parliament and to the press, MEPs having to react on the basis of leaked documents....and we're still missing the real documents ! .
Don't just take our word for it. Here's the verdict from GERMANY:
"A comprehensive increase in the EU budget is unacceptable at a time when all member states are making significant efforts to consolidate their national budgets. Therefore, we will not be able to accept the Commission's proposal."
Very glad to have contributed to the Citizens’ Panel on the EU budget, organised by the European Commission, as a member of the Knowledge Committee. It was fascinating to hear 150 citizens from across the EU debate how the budget should be spent — and to help them refine and shape their ideas.
5/L'UE devra donc manier avec prudence la menace d'une taxe numérique européenne: l'utiliser comme levier dans les négociations commerciales, tout en affichant sa volonté de l'abandonner si Washington accepte de rouvrir les discussions sur le pilier 1 de l'accord OCDE
4/Certes, il semble hautement improbable que Trump relance une dynamique multilatérale. Mais l'UE ne devrait pas fermer la porte à une future coopération en cas de revirement politique aux États-Unis..
3/En decouplant l'idée d'une taxe numérique européenne des négociations de l'OCDE et la liant aux discussions commerciales bilatérales entre l'UE et les États-Unis l'UE prend le risque d'enterrer tout espoir d'adopter le pilier 1 dans l'avenir
2/mais il ne faut pas oublier que le pilier 1 de l'accord de l'OCDE visait à remplacer les différentes taxes sur les services numériques existantes (aujourd'hui, tous les grands États membres de l'UE, à l'exception de l'Allemagne, en ont une)
1/ L'Union européenne a toute la légitimité pour agir : les grandes entreprises numériques américaines continuent de payer en Europe des taux d'imposition bien inférieurs à ceux des entreprises traditionnelles.
Ma tribune pour le journal "L' Opinion": L’UE doit manier avec précaution la menace d’une taxe numérique européenne lopinion.fr/internationa...?
With Philipp Lausberg from @epc-official.bsky.social a call to embed permanent crisis-response tools into the next EU multiannual budget. Main message: the Union must shift from improvisation to anticipation to face future geopolitical and climate risks
📢 DISCUSSION PAPER: Beyond ad-hoc responses: Strengthening the EU’s fiscal capacity for security and climate
Eulalia Rubio and Philipp Lausberg argue for the integration of crisis preparedness into the EU budget. @eulaliarubio.bsky.social
Read here 👉 www.epc.eu/en/Publicati...
The results of the coalition negotiations between CDU/CSU and SPD on Europe have been leaked. Some institutional aspects:
- better enforcement of rule of law, including suspension of voting rights + making conditionality mechanism into instrument to sanction violations of EU values more broadly
New focus paper! 📣 What lessons can we learn from EU's fiscal responses to the #covid19pandemic for future emergencies?
Philipp Lausberg and @eulaliarubio.bsky.social propose concrete investment strategies for EU's #defence and natural disasters.
Read them here: regroup-horizon.eu/publications...
Without reforms, CAP transfers would increase by 22-25%. Ukraine would become their main beneficiary, given the scale of its agricultural sector (see this excellent study by @eulaliarubio.bsky.social & al www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en... )...
An alternative would be to unite forces and apply these taxing rights together, establishing a common EU border tax as proposed by Pascal Saint Amans some time ago-this would have the additional advantage of creating new revenues for the common EU budget
www.bruegel.org/policy-brief...
The question is to which extent EU countries will dare to exert their taxing rights on US multinationals if they are taxed below 15%, or will refrain from doing it, for fear of Trump's retaliatory measures.
Notice that the EU has already adopted pillar 2 of the OECD tax deal. This imposes a minimum 15% tax on EU multinationals but also gives EU countries the possibility to tax collect a "top-up" tax from U.S. multinationals if paying a lower rate in the US
For those who missed it, Trump has also withdrawn from the OECD global tax deal (bye bye the proposal to create an "own resource" based on pillar 1)
In the memorandum he also alerts that US will adopt counter measures if foreign countries apply the deal on US multinat in their territories
9/Also worth noting that the study is the second part of a broader research drawing lessons from the implementation of various EU temporary instruments set up in response to Covid-19 - you can find part I here: europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etud...
8/You can find the study here: www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etud...
7/Finally, we explore how these new crisis instruments could work in complementary with already existing EU tools and mechanisms (such as the EU solidarity Fund or the Civic Protection Mechanism), so as to develop a coherent 'toolkit' to address shocks and emergencies.
6/We also examine options to build a permanent debt-financed EU crisis capacity. Rather than transforming SURE into a permanent instrument, we propose to expand the scope of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) to include labour market shocks.