Yup. That's my reading of his goals. Remember that Patton is one of his favorite movies and MacArthur one of his favorite generals. He wants his war to come straight out of central casting. Unconditional surrender with mushroom clouds included.
And the 2018 NPR was 100 pages, so it could be used again, if you edit out the author’s grievances. Also, the Biden Administration’s DOD wasn’t thrilled about publishing an unclassified NPR report, which is how you got a very short piece attached to the NDS.
NDS
There is no mandate to conduct a nuclear posture review. There was a congressional mandate for the 2001 NPR, as Congress wanted to delay and prevent Clinton from retiring some stuff, but others have been DOD initiatives. Also, any new NPR would just track 2022 Strategic Posture Commission Report.
I'd suggest you ask the JAGs, but Hegseth fired them.
Jon -- you've stated the normal planning process. The Jags approve pre-planned options. But, if the President wants a different option that doesn't meet the criteria for pre-planning, they can't just refuse. As General Kehler said in the 2017 hearing, they'd suggest more appropriate targets.
Four decades
Oooh. That’s bad. We got pretty slush. Should be gone by tomorrow
I have worked through more than 40 years in this community, and have tried to ignore those who identify "the arms control community" as a single entity, then ascribe the most extreme strawman to everyone they include in that community. I've been fighting this off for at least 25 years. Sick of it.
Always. But sometimes it’s Ok to hold back and go for toning instead of strength (no, I didn’t read the article, just answered the question)
"We won't help you fight the conventional war, but, if things go badly, we'll start a nuclear war for you!"
THIS IS NOT A REASSURING OR CREDIBLE STATEMENT OF EXTENDED DETERENCE. And Bridge should know better.
Of course!
Same.
Sorry, but this sounds like gibberish to me.
Quite a statement on what decade their cultural references come from. Such a fail right after the joy of Bad Bunny.
I had the exact same thought (with the same reference) when I saw it!
What does he think all of us nuclear experts have been working on for the past 5 years????? And the experts who work for him don't want a new treaty.
There was no reason to undercut it since limits were high enough to allow all planned forces—until 1985 when the U.S. deployment of increasing numbers of ALCM equipped bombers would push us over limits. So we withdrew the pledge (and blamed the Soviets for violating the “spirit” of the SALT I.
I start with Schelling; combine a bunch of his quotes and you get "arms control is tool of national security policy" and works WITH military planning, not in opposition to it. Then I switch over to Michael Krepon's point that arms control takes the rough edges of deterrence. This is not new for me.
I've initially got pushback on this description (AC has to be a treaty with reductions!) But this describes arms control as a toolbox, and that box includes risk reduction, CBMs, warm fuzzy statements, restraints on forces and operations, etc. So absence of treaties doesn't mean end of arms control.
How I define/describe the issue: Arms control is a process that nations have used to manage their nuclear competition, demonstrate restraint, and reduce the risk of nuclear war (or escalation to nuclear war) even if it doesn't produce legally binding treaties that reduce nuclear weapons.
Who are you trying to deter? What are you trying to deter them from doing? What tools do you have to implement this "strategy" of deterrence? How can cooperation and restraint (i.e. arms control) help manage that deterrence process and reduce the risks of escalation to nuclear use? That's my agenda.
I don't think it breaks brains as much as its been so overused that its lost all meaning. I'd start with the basic question: who are you trying to deter? Deter the from doing what? What tools do you have to deter? Then use Krepon's line that "arms control takes the rough edges of deterrence."
I don't think 6 months is a big win for anyone (unless the foundational differences over an agenda for talks can be resolved) But I do agree that we need a fundamental rethinking of deterrence and arms control. What's the stability and security problem we want to solve with the arms control process?
The only way 6 months is a meaningful time is if the two can agree on an agenda. Will the U.S. limit Golden Dome? Will Russia limit its tactical stuff? This isn't about numbers, but will anybody agree to restrain their forces below NST limits? At best, maybe we get some "nukes are bad" statements.
Six months! What a win! Honestly, though, do you trust the process/outcome when the U.S. negotiators probably don't even know what "START" stands for? I'd call it the "blind leading the blind," but I'm sure the Russians are not blind, but they could be quite amused at their leverage here.
Mazel Tov! Can't wait to dig in!
I’m not sure that’s a niche opinion (I share it). The security environment has always shaped the prospects for arms control. It’s just not the loudest opinion in public discussions. And the phrase “arms race” is thrown out to describe a range of force posture decisions that aren’t always “racing.”
Not really. They are trying to communicate something (anything) that preserves some semblance of extended deterrence—possibly because someone in the building said “we can’t just abandon our allies” or “we can’t just give Europe to Russia!” But they just don’t get the nuance and politics of ED.
I wouldn’t say “nothing.” There are a few credible experts still in the building and at STRATCOM. But I’m pretty sure the new senior leadership has a very rudimentary and simplistic understanding of nuclear posture.
