Anything specific you're looking for? Don't have an archive per se, but have a few of them collected.
25.02.2026 06:04
👍 0
🔁 0
💬 1
📌 0
Anything specific you're looking for? Don't have an archive per se, but have a few of them collected.
4/5 Finally, I examine the Internet blackout in Iran during the June 2025 war with Israel as a case study to examine the efficacy, legitimacy, and possible implications of such an action.
3/5 To this effect, I adopt the third-party countermeasures approach and propose implementing such countermeasures in the form of offensive cyber operations to disrupt internet blackouts.
2/5 Specifically, I propose that the efforts made to date to mitigate Internet connectivity interference, such as censorship-resistant communication channels and Starlink's global Internet connectivity, are good to have but are not robust enough.
A new @lawfaremedia.org piece where I argue that if internet access is to be considered a human right, then internet blackouts violate that right and a more robust response by the international community to combat state-implemented blackouts is required. 🧵/5
@percepticon.bsky.social might also interest you ;-)
Also, I understand that it is currently being pitched around to other states (you need to finance the project somehow, I guess...<>). At least this is the context in which the Israeli media covers the remarks about cyber security cooperation during Germany's Dobrindt visit.
When Israeli officials talk about "Iron Dome for cyberspace" - they don't aim for a dome, but mean a solution based on the logic deterrence by denial against cyber incidents, with "Cyber Dome" being a specific national active cyber defense solution by the INCD (the Israeli cyber defense agency).
There is a bit of context that needs to be added here. "Domification" (i.e., calling defensive solutions "Iron Dome for X" or "Y Dome") is a quite obscure and funny facet of Israeli flavor of securitization.
Better to read as "An Israeli cybersecurity company providing WAF and DDoS mitigation solutions says its Israeli customers experienced a 700% increase in events detected by its products." Which is an Ok newswire, but way less sexy and newsworthy (even though it might be due high-profile customers).
The #GGE norms, which weren't aimed at confidence and capacity building measures, narrowed what IHL/LOAC allowed - and thus were doomed from day one. Some will even claim they did some damage along the way. This doesn't mean there no place for "Cyber norms". Just not for this set of formal ones.
Does anyone else bicker with their LLM of choice? Mine are so bad. Today perplexity pissed me off so I made her read Arms & Influence then write “there are only two types of deterrence” 100 times.
That looks interesting! Is any more info about the methodology behind those score available?
From a short exploration I can already see how it can be useful for my own research, which makes me eager to explore it further and hope that more MDR vendors would follow suit and make the data underlying their yearly report openly available. 6/6
3/6 This thread (and report), on the other hand, suggest that at least as far as ransomware is concerned it might indeed be a quite simple technical problem - that we should focus our resilience policy efforts on finding proactive technical solution for.
2/6 It makes it seems that while many cyber security thinkers moved from treating it as a technical problem, i.e., something that should be fixed after the fact, to treating it as a political issue.
Still hadn't the time to properly read the @sophossecurity.bsky.social Active Adversary Report, but I find this thread - cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog... - by @GossiTheDog.cyberplace.social.ap.brid.gy highly interesting. 1/🧵
5/6 Finally, as a researcher engaged with quantitative research into cyber security, it is great to see some of the data underlying the report publicly available (github.com/sophoslabs/A...), even though, unfortunately, only the data for the latest report is available.
4/6 The data hints that better default configurations, especially enabling MFA and reducing exposed services, brute-force protection, and better internet facing appliances patching mechanisms might go a long way for improving cyber resilience against Ransomware attacks and generally.
The 21st century has gone from
jump the shark to tariff the penguin
4/5 Finally, we draw some lessons on the scope and expected efficacy of private-sector CCO/ACD, extending beyond the common "hacking back" debate, norms of responsible behavior in cyber operations, and the importance of communications for fostering both.
3/5 We call out significant practices evident and language used to juxtapose with some previously published examinations and attempts to define responsible behavior in cyber operations and industry practices.
2/5 We do so by analyzing the texts published by Sophos, especially the blog posts by Sophos's CEO Joe Levy and CISO @rossmckerchar.bsky.social
In a new paper with @joedevanny.bsky.social for @lawfare.bsky.social, we use the "Pacific Rim" campaign by @sophossecurity.bsky.social as an opportunity to further the understanding of norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace and counter-cyber operations (CCO)/active cyber defense (ACD).
🧵/5
Living in Israel - there is no need to imagine any of this. Though a difference on the order of magnitude - all those experiences are just too common. This is what makes the lack of explicit and overt Israeli support of Ukraine ever more shameful.
For more details (and there is quite a bit of those, despite Ariel's best efforts to control my fondness of those), read the full analysis at - www.inss.org.il/publication/...
6/6
5/6 Instead, we call for focus on implementing a sustainable sovereign datacenter infrastructure build-out and on improving the Israel-USA technological cooperation in a fashion that will enable Israel to be considered a Tier 1 country vis-a-vis the US AI diffusion rules.
4/6 In the conclusion of our analysis we call on the Israeli govt to avoid getting intoxicated by the promise of "cheap Chinese pathways to AI leadership".