@frhoffmann
Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project, University of Oslo. Defense policy, missile technology, and nuclear strategy. Weekly analysis of missile tech, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence 👇 https://missilematters.substack.com/subscribe
Thread. NB: “At this point, I assess that the Gulf states are in a comfortable position, relatively speaking of course. Don't discount the Iranian ballistic missile threat entirely, and long-range drones continue to pose challenges. But the period of greatest danger is likely over.”
At this point, I assess that the Gulf states are in a comfortable position, relatively speaking of course.
Don't discount the Iranian ballistic missile threat entirely, and long-range drones continue to pose challenges.
But the period of greatest danger is likely over.
5/5
The same applies to other Gulf states, though less data is available for them.
This means that concerns about interceptor shortages were justified.
However, strike intensity has declined sharply since, greatly reducing the Iranian ballistic missile threat
4/5
In the first two days of the war, Iranian strike intensity was relatively high.
During that period, I estimate that the UAE may have expended as much as 20-40% of its interceptor arsenal.
Had that intensity continued, the UAE would likely have faced shortages within days.
3/5
The best way to describe the early phase of the war is as a race to the bottom.
Iran has attempted to quickly deplete Gulf state ballistic missile interceptor arsenals.
The United States and Israel have sought to rapidly degrade Iran’s mobile missile launcher capability.
2/5
🚀 I published my latest Missile Matters post earlier today, providing a first assassment of the missile war over the Gulf region.
In short: The U.S.-Israeli counter-TEL strategy appears to be working.
Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/race-to-th...
Short summary below.
1/5
Race to the Bottom: Who's Winning the Missile War in the Middle East?
missilematters.substack.com/p/race-to-th...
TEL hunting, interceptor availability, and implications for Ukraine
Buen análisis de @frhoffmann.bsky.social
Der heutige Substack von @frhoffmann.bsky.social meldet euch auch mal für den Newsletter an.
missilematters.substack.com/p/race-to-th...
Some quick thoughts on Macron‘s speech and the announcement of deploying parts of the French Strategic Air Force an allied territory. 👇
I published a new Missile Matters post earlier today, discussing Ukraine's recent deep strike against the Votkinsk missile plant and its implications for the missile supply chain.
You can access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/flamingo-f...
Short summary below
1/7
The good news is that Russia’s industries remain heavily centralized and its air defense has suffered badly. This creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
As such, there is real potential, and Europe must do everything possible to enable Ukrainian deep strikes.
7/7
How severe the supply chain disruption is remains difficult to say, but I find the widely circulated “six-month production stop” assessment optimistic from a Ukrainian perspective.
The strike is an excellent first step, but additional strikes of this kind will be necessary.
6/7
Supply chain disruption will depend on three factors:
1) The amount of previously produced and stockpiled material
2) Potential other suppliers
2) The ability to replace machinery quickly
To replace some of the machinery, Russia likely has to rely on external suppliers.
5/7
People tend to overestimate the lethal radii of missiles. Even Flamingo’s 1,150 kg warhead will produce locally lethal blast overpressure effects only within a radius of ~30-40 meters.
More significant is the resulting fire, which may have destroyed the entire building.
4/7
The Flamingo missile reportedly hit workshop 19, which houses a galvanizing and metal-forming shop that performs electroplating, stamping, and surface treatment of structural components prior to final assembly.
As such, its role lies upstream in the supply chain.
3/7
The Votkinsk plant is the main manufacturer of Russia’s strategic missiles, including ICBMs & SLBMs, while also producing the 9M723 SRBM and contributing to the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal MRBM at the component level. It is also the main contractor for the Oreshnik IRBM.
2/7
I published a new Missile Matters post earlier today, discussing Ukraine's recent deep strike against the Votkinsk missile plant and its implications for the missile supply chain.
You can access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/flamingo-f...
Short summary below
1/7
"For European partners, UA's current security situation illustrates why heavy deep-strike capabilities are so necessary. While missile defense can provide effective localized protection for high-value targets, it cannot protect the entirety of Europe’s territory, especially over prolonged periods"
Oekraïne trof afgelopen vrijdag voor het eerst een belangrijk doelwit van de Russische raketindustrie met een 🇺🇦 Flamingo-raket.
Maar om een fabriek zoals die in Votkinsk volledig buiten werking te stellen zijn tientallen raketten nodig, schat @frhoffmann.bsky.social:
🧵 1/3
In der Nacht vom 20. auf den 21. Februar startete die Ukraine mehrere landgestützte Marschflugkörper des Typs FP-5 Flamingo in Richtung Russland. Der Beitrag von @frhoffmann.bsky.social erörtert die Implikationen des Angriffs.
www.hartpunkt.de/flamingo-fin...
1\ This is worth a read. If you can begin to understand correlation, you should be much harder to trick. You'll spot mistakes in prevailing narratives.
In the post, I illustrate this mostly by looking at the reporting related to Helsing's HX-2.
But it is similarly applicable to a broad range of weapons relevant to strike warfare.
4/4
The success probability of Ukrainian deep-strike missions is not fixed but instead depends on correlated underlying conditions that, when shifted, cause successes and failures to cluster rather than evenly disperse.
3/4
Ever wonder why Ukrainian successes and failures in deep-strike operations appear to cluster?
I.e., why are there periods - like now - where several successful consecutive operations are reported, followed by periods with no reports on successful strikes?
This is likely no accident.
2/4
🚀 Over the weekend, I published a new Missile Matters post on the nature of correlated and uncorrelated failures in strike warfare.
It's a lot more theoretical than my usual posts, but if you are interested in strike warfare, it's worth a read.
missilematters.substack.com/p/correlated...
1/4
6) The operation will represent a major test for the U.S. Air Force and provide significant combat experience for U.S. military personnel as the United States prepares for potential confrontation with China, which has yet to fight a high-intensity war under modern conditions.
6/6
5) Iran’s most plausible strategy is to prolong the conflict and inflict enough damage on U.S. forces and regional partners to shift U.S. domestic opinion. If Iran can meaningfully damage U.S. forces, it will pursue that path; otherwise, countervalue strikes against Israel are most likely.
5/6
4) Iran’s ability to generate large-scale ballistic missile launches will be limited to one or two, perhaps three, major salvos. After that, attrition of the TEL fleet will reduce launches to sporadic ballistic missile activity with limited impact.
4/6
3) Stand-off capabilities will play only a limited role beyond the initial phase. Anti-radiation and cruise missiles may be used against SEAD and DEAD targets in the first strike, but most effects are very likely to come from direct-attack munitions.
3/6
2) The U.S. and Israeli air forces will conduct continuous operations against Iranian transporter erector launchers; i.e., 24/7. Sortie generation posed a major challenge for Israel during the 12-day war. U.S. participation solves this issue.
2/6