It is so sad what Hegel and Marx did to dialecticsβ¦
It is so sad what Hegel and Marx did to dialecticsβ¦
South Park has always covered news more accurately than the media!
I understand your point, but I prefer Dennett and the Dennettians over Chalmers and the Chalmerians any time of the day. In my opinion, Chalmers has done (and continues to do) an immense disservice to philosophy and science with this kind of talk
And if it is used as an βalternativeβ to contemporary cognitive science, thatβs just scientific denial in disguise.
If this first-person experience is meant to be entirely subjective, then it is not only unscientific but, by definition, forever beyond the reach of any kind of shared knowledgeβperhaps a theme more suited to poetry or religion.
Should just call them science deniers, until people realize thats pretty much it
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Completely agree
In my view, the zombie argument is among the weakest in philosophy, as it commits a petitio principii fallacy: by hypothesizing that an exact duplicate of a functional human being could lack consciousness, one is already presupposing the falsity of physicalism.
The zombie argument not only refrains from assuming that physicalism is true (as many of its proponents claim), but in fact presupposes its falsity, and if its false, it cannot be necessarily true. The argument is epistemologically innocuous as it provides no independent reason to doubt physicalism.
In my view, the zombie argument is among the weakest in philosophy, as it commits a petitio principii fallacy: by hypothesizing that an exact duplicate of a functional human being could lack consciousness, one is already presupposing the falsity of physicalism.
And non-physicalists approaches is even older
Paraphrasing Sheldon Cooper; nature, the heartless bitch.
Thats pretty much what Eliminative Materialism is about!
Arenβt you describing emergent properties of complex systems?
#Consciousness may be an illusion and yet still possess ethical significance!
#ethics #philmind #philski #phisci
And see, thatβs exactly why Chalmersβ position in philosophy of mind isnβt considered scientific. While heβs not a "substance dualist", heβs clearly a "property dualist"βplacing his view outside empiricism and physicalism.
If by βoperate under physicalismβ you mean using physics terms while addressing emergent concepts and laws, I agreeβeach science has its level of description. But science today doesnβt see those phenomena as occurring beyond the four fundamental physical interactions, and so: physicalism.
I confess I donβt see your pointβnon-physicalism, by definition, implies a break from the laws of physics (e.g., dualist positions in philosophy of mind). If a phenomenon is understood within the scope of the four fundamental physical interactions, then it is *not* non-physicalism.
I mean, if you can empirically demonstrate that there are phenomena that clearly happen outside the scope of these four fundamental physical interactions, you would likely be regarded as the most important scientist of the century!
In other words, I fail to see how an empirical test could be conducted outside the scope of the four fundamental physical interactions. If something occurs in empirical reality, it must ultimately arise from those interactionsβthat's why they are called fundamental in the physical sense.
I tend to disagree. All empirical sciences operate this way. Even emergent phenomenaβ laws of chemistry, population biology...β is understood within the scientific framework not as new ontological realms but as falling under the four fundamental physical interactions (with degrees of complexity).
When I said 'scientific context,' I was not excluding the part of philosophy that is done close to empirical science; philosophy of scienceβat least since Popperβis usually developed within a scientific context and by thinkers trained in science. The same with philosophy of mathematics and so on...
That's a very strange question: the discussion about 'physicalism' (and other terms like 'causation') is clearly part of the philosophy of science, even when conducted by trained scientistsβor conversely, by philosophers trained in science. And I genuinely fail to see the relevance of the question.
Yes, the terminology changed. 'Physicalism' today has a much more objective meaning than 'materialism'β a mere fossil of hylemorphismβand imo is far from meaningless. In scientific contexts, physicalism usually refers to everything within the scope of the four fundamental physical interactions.
Physicalism is not merely a marginal view in science, but central to its methodology and underlying conception of nature. Non-physicalist positions go against the very core of scientific inquiry, rendering such theories incompatible with the scientific framework (if not ignoring empirical findings).
And there are empirically robust theories of consciousness today supported by findings in cognitive science (for example GWT). I acknowledge it's a (rapidly) developing field with many unresolved aspects. Still, we don't fully understand gravity either. In both cases, we need more science, not less
The lack of a well-established scientific theory of consciousness is understandable, given that it's a new and highly complex field. This does not mean we should abandon empirical scientific practices in studying it; had we done so in other fields, science wouldnβt be here today.
I would say that physicalism is not just a marginal theory, but central to scientific endeavorβnot only methodologically, but also in its view of nature. Non-physicalism opposes the very core of science. Weβd need extremely strong evidence that itβs false before even considering setting it aside.
Those theories are largely considered scientific. They do not merely share a loose connection with cognitive neuroscience but they arise from and are intrinsically linked to findings in the discipline. Baarsβ book Cognition, Brain, and Consciousness, for example, makes this connection very clear.
Being anti-scientific is not only always problematic but also highly dangerous in todayβs society. If something has not yet been sufficiently explained by #science (like #consciousness), it simply means we need more scienceβnot less. #philsci #philmind #philosophy