@jaimeyassif
NTI | bio Vice President, biophysicist. Working to strengthen biotech governance, biosecurity & pandemic preparedness. Formerly US Health & Human Services and Dept of Defense, Federation of American Scientists, Chatham House, Open Phil, UC Berkeley
Applications are open for the 2025 NTI | bio Next Generation Biosecurity Delegation. This is a great opportunity to gain experience with international biosecurity engagement & meet thought leaders and policy makers in the field. You can learn more and apply here: tinyurl.com/4bene94r
US Health and Human Services Secretary Kennedy’s announcement that the government will cancel or otherwise alter up to $500M in contracts to develop mRNA vaccines, the technology used to respond to COVID-19, is a grave mistake. Check out our statement here: www.nti.org/news/hhs-can...
OpenAI has classified its new ChatGPT Agent model as having a “High capability in the biological domain." Check out this new blog post by Nikki Teran outlining OpenAI's proactive biosecurity approach to safeguard their new model against misuse: www.nti.org/risky-busine...
The new Executive Order on "Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research" suggests some promising actions to protect moddern bioscience and biotech against misuse, but it also threatens crucial research that protects Americans from biological threats.
www.nti.org/news/executi...
"The Global Health Security Index has documented this weakness. National governments should build on the positive momentum from this agreement and secure the investments that will be essential to protect vulnerable populations around the world from the next pandemic threat—regardless of its source.”
In the statement I note: “The devastating impacts of COVID-19 laid bare the frightening reality that all countries remain dangerously unprepared for future threats—including those that could be more damaging than the pandemic we just experienced..."
While this is a win for cooperative approaches to address global challenges, the active retreat by the United States from its leadership position by withdrawing from both the Pandemic Accord negotiations and the WHO, is disappointing.
NTI applauds today’s announcement that the International Negotiating Body of the WHO has reached a deal on the language of the Pandemic Accord. Pandemics pose a global threat & this proposed agreement is proof the world can unify to reduce the most catastrophic risks.
www.nti.org/news/nti-sta...
Great opportunity to join the NTI | bio team. Come work with us! www.nti.org/job-listing/...
"On this World Health Day 2025 as US domestic & global health policies undergo a realignment the world must recommit to address both the urgent and the underlying health challenges that shape our lives." New blog post by NTI's Lauren Maynor, Sara Kaufman & David Stiefel.
www.nti.org/risky-busine...
Also great to see the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) featured, along with its Common Mechanism for DNA synthesis screening, to guard against deliberate misuse of bioscience and biotechnology. ibbis.bio
The piece helpfully highlights the importance of enhancing transparency for dual-use bioscience research to build confidence in BWC compliance, and notes some of the new ideas that NTI is exploring.
I noted that, while AIxBio capabilities offer tremendous societal benefits, they also could increase risks of developing “weapons that are nastier than what’s found in nature—more transmissible and more deadly. Or resistant to existing vaccines or drugs.”
"...the BWC lacks a mechanism to verify compliance—or even meaningful transparency measures. If international monitors can’t gain access to labs, or glean clues to what is happening there, it’s hard to judge when dual-use research—peaceful science that can have military applications—crosses a line"
Great new piece in Science Magazine by Richard Stone about the Biological Weapons Convention at its 50-year anniversary, and the need to modernize it to meet 21st century challenges.
www.science.org/content/arti...
Excellent post by Greg Butchello outlining how NTI | bio defines biosecurity. Since its emergence, the term “biosecurity” has had a variety of meanings. We define biosecurity as: policies and practices that protect against the deliberate misuse of biology to cause harm."
www.nti.org/risky-busine...
I had a great conversation with A'ndre Gonawela at the Burn Bag podcast about vital steps that we need to take to bolster biosecurity and pandemic preparedness. You can check it out here 👇 burnbag.buzzsprout.com/1225250/epis...
We will continue to convene these discussions at future international AI summits, focusing on AI & biosecurity and incorporating emerging issues at the nexus of AI and nuclear security.
AI safety is a critical priority as part of broader international discussions about advancing AI capabilities, and it is vital to ensure that AIxBio & biosecurity continue to be part of the conversation.
Several experts from AI safety institutes noted the value of developing a comprehensive research agenda to map out priorities for exploring technical guardrails for AIxBio capabilities, and agreed that collaborating with non-governmental experts to achieve this goal would be helpful to their work.
There was broad agreement about the importance of reaching consensus among technical experts to define thresholds in AI development that present unacceptable biological risks--and the need to build political support among policy makers for such biorisk defitions.
...and we focused on three topics: AIxBio risk thresholds and mitigations; Advancing a strategic research agenda to explore a comprehensive approach to reducing AIxbio risks; and Opportunities for AISI collaboration to safeguard AIxbio capabilities.
Yesterday NTI and RAND co-hosted an event at the Paris AI Action Summit on AI Safety Institutes and AIxBio governance--in conversation with biosecurity experts & AI model developers. We had productive discussions among an impressive international group of experts ...
The U.S. must continue to lead on AI safety & I'm optimistic this can be done while balancing competitiveness considerations. The Trump Administration has an opportunity to strike the right balance between AI safety and advancing innovation in the United States. www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
The financial commitment of staying in WHO is significant—hundreds of millions of dollars per year—but that’s nothing compared to the trillions of dollars in economic losses the United States is likely to face from another pandemic.
Failure to do so means the United States and the world will not have the capacity to get ahead of the next pandemic—which could be as damaging as COVID-19 or potentially much worse.
Given the devastating losses caused by COVID-19, WHO must be strengthened to combat the global public health threats that continue to arise, including H5N1 bird flu, Mpox, and other deadly infectious diseases. President Trump can lead this effort.
...demonstrate greater independence from member states, and refocus its use of financial contributions to the organization.
President Trump should retain U.S. membership, while leading a renegotiation of terms for U.S. commitments to WHO. By ensuring our voice remains, President Trump can use his considerable leverage to motivate WHO to reform its management practices for global health crises ...
