Widespread inability to understand the way global energy markets work is a genuine risk factor right now. The kicker is the way the policies that flow from these misunderstandings have been joined up with a concerted effort to demolish alternatives and the ability to hedge against price shocks.
A situation in which Gulf partners are made keenly aware of their second-class status while the U.S.’s other security partner undertakes actions that further undermine their security. The contradictions at the heart of the U.S. agenda of integration and normalization have been laid bare.
If the war drags on this is going to be a growing source of friction with the Gulf:
“There has also been resentment in the region at the perception that the US has prioritised Israel’s security over their own.”
www.ft.com/content/9353... Gulf states in race to secure more US interceptors
Administrations contort themselves to avoid any suggestion that U.S. is contemplating ground forces, often even when special operations forces are already deployed, so it’s striking to see them say this. But the administration’s political judgments about the war have been off from the start.
A really great piece from my colleague @stevepomper.bsky.social - the story told here is one of accumulated failure by both parties. If you work to undermine any checks or guardrails on yourself when you are in office, then those expanded powers end up with others. And here we are.
This is not even close to the worst-case scenario:
“I guess the worst case would be we do this and somebody takes over who’s as bad as the previous person”
Trump Lays Out His ‘Worst Case’ Scenario in Iran www.nytimes.com/2026/03/03/u...
Happy to talk with @zackbeauchamp.bsky.social for this piece. We discussed the pathways and contours of a worst-case outcome. Not particularly likely, of course, but a scenario you have to at least contemplate.
In recent decades, state failure in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, has been damaging to U.S. interests and helped undermine efforts to shift attention and resources elsewhere. So it’s astonishing to see a U.S. administration actively contemplating state failure in Iran as a potential policy goal.
Agree with that assessment. And to the extent this can be sustained, a big question, then the situation with air defenses starts to become much a bigger problem.
NEW
The White House has submitted its War Powers report to Congress for the attack on Iran.
The justification for military action rests on 1) Iran's supposed continued quest for nuclear weapons and 2) the threat Iran's missiles pose to US forces, vessels, civilians and those of partners. 1/n
"Power has gravitated to two individuals in Iran. Both are former commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps."
@alivaez.bsky.social explains who is making decisions in the Islamic Republic to @cnn.com as the war between the U.S., Israel and Iran intensifies. x.com/BeckyCNN/sta...
If you believe the U.S. has the influence and leverage to block Israel from going to war with Iran, which it does, then it’s much harder to then argue the U.S. has been dragged into war by Israel. Trump wanted this war.
This is an amazing bar to set. So if this war lasts less than two years, under this framing, it will be all good.
From two drones according to the Saudi MOD. It doesn’t sound like major damage but highlights how vulnerable US assets and interests are at the moment.
Netanyahu has been pushing Trump to strike Iran, but the decision to go to war is 100% Trump’s. He wanted this conflict, buoyed by the Maduro operation and limited fall out from Midnight Hammer. But growing perception that Netanyahu duped Trump into war, even if mistaken, is a huge risk for Israel.
Should be alarming to see such low approval numbers at this stage of a war. Suggests the political dangers of this war are quite big (not to even mention the national security implications).
Immediate effects on readiness elsewhere and these dilemmas will only deepen for the Trump administration the longer the war goes on. Critically, it’s not just the U.S. now that has a say in how long this war goes on.
U.S. policy on Cuba after the Maduro capture has created a humanitarian crisis and the Trump administration had seemed intent on undermining the political status quo. Signs now that the U.S. may be calibrating its approach, but the situation remains fragile.
www.crisisgroup.org/qna/latin-am...
ONLINE EVENT | Crisis Briefing on the U.S., Israel and Iran
3 March | 11am Washington, DC | 6pm Tel Aviv | 7.30pm Tehran
w/ Ali Vaez, Mairav Zonszein, Michael Hanna, Yasmine Farouk, Max Rodenbeck, and Lahib Higel
us06web.zoom.us/webinar/regi...
A key issue for the U.S. going forward will be managing its relations with the Gulf. As frontline states to the conflict and now direct targets in Iran's retaliation, they have more to lose than either the U.S. or Israel and much less say in how the war proceeds. That is a recipe for friction.
Lots of worrisome signals about what next, but the idea that the U.S. can just destabilize Iran and then wash its hands and walk away unscathed is particularly so.
That we have managed to avoid full-on regional war in recent years has been taken by some as a demonstration that such risks are overblown, but speed with which war is escalating on multiple fronts belies the idea of another quick, contained military operation for Trump, whatever his initial intent.
And no statement from Hezbollah, so I guess let’s wait and see.
I’m frankly a little surprised they’ve entered the war in light of their degraded state. Attention will now turn to the Houthis to see if they follow suit.
This. Whoever it is.
“not because the Middle East no longer matters, but because it is no longer the constant irritant, and potential source of imminent catastrophe, that it once was.”
“But the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are thankfully over—” www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/u...
3 takeaways from this interview. There is a possibility of coming Trump-Israel divergence regarding desired end states via talks w/regime; an emboldened Trump hardly considers how things could go wrong; and he doesn’t have a fixed idea about what this war is for.
www.theatlantic.com/national-sec...
This has been on my mind a lot over the past two years, and I wonder if it is less a question of capacity as opposed to will. When the moment of truth came they didn’t want to go all in and instead played the old game of survival, which saw them get eroded incrementally over the course of the war.
