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@eborbath
πΌ Assistant Prof. for Participation Research @uniheidelberg.bsky.social π§ PI, The New Climate Divide (Emmy Noether) π§³ Guest @wzb.bsky.social π¬ Parties β’ Movements β’ Participation β’ Climate Politics π Quant Methods πͺπΊ Western, Central & Eastern EU β°οΈπ΄ββοΈπ
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πΈπ¨I am hiring 2 Postdocs for my ERC-funded project SOCDEBT on #debt dynamics across countries. One position: #SocialStratification + strong quantitative skills. The other: qualitative research and #EconomicSociology. waitkus.github.io/SOCDEBT/ π¨πΈ
NEW PUBLICATION
βHow the Media Cordon Sanitaire Crumbles: Lessons from Germanyβ now out in @prxjournal.bsky.social
π doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2026.2621808
Iβm very happy that this paper is out β this project is particularly important to me.
I've been thinking about this a lot. There's a major tension here between "get my data cleaned quickly, efficiently, and as a responsible steward of my research resources" and "teach the next generation how to conduct research." Anyone who tells you the answer is easy is kidding themselves
Weβve just released the Youth Wing Membership Survey (YOUMEM) dataset:
dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/ha...
Itβs the largest comparative study of party youth wing members ever conducted, with survey responses from over 5,000 members of 12 centre-left and centre-right youth wings in 6 countries. π§΅
For the FES, I wrote a short brief about how mainstream party strategies have fueled far-right success. They move toward more anti-immigration positions to win voters back. This does not work, but shifts public opinion to the right. Parties then react to shifts in public opinion. A vicious cycle.
π§΅I am happy to announce a new article in Political Behavior @polbehavior.bsky.social, βAre the Politically Active Better Represented?β, co-authored with @jenny-oser.bsky.social, @rdassonneville.bsky.social, @professormpersson.bsky.social, and Anders Sundell.
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
now open access :)
The paper is part of our special issue with Chendi Wang
and Argyrios Altiparmakis on "Electoral mobilisation in turbulent times".
I write a separate thread on the issue once all papers are online. Until then, you can already read our introductory article: journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...
I show where change comes from: established parties have routinized, distinct profiles, while new parties expand the agenda by politicizing conflicts that were previously less emphasized. Bottom line: even with high party turnover, cleavage theory still helps explain how competition stays structured
βWhat structures competition?
Economic and cultural conflicts matter across the region, but cultural conflicts gain importance, especially where democratic backsliding intensifies (notably ππΊπ΅π±). Romania looks different: cultural issues are least salient there, and its overall structuration is weaker
Main finding: programmatic competition is substantial and (mostly) stable over time, but it varies across countries.
Latvia comes out as the most programmatic system, Hungary and Poland remain fairly programmatic even under erosion, while Romania is the clear laggard.
π To get at this, I zoom in on what voters actually see during campaigns. I analyze Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania from the 1990s to the early 2020s.
π I use the PolDem National Election Campaign Dataset, hand-coded newspaper coverage from two daily papers per country.
π¨New publication on cleavages in party competition in Central and Eastern Europe π¨
CEE party systems are famously volatile, but does that mean that they are unstructured?
βI ask whether competition has become programmatically organized around enduring cleavages
π doi.org/10.1177/1354...
Thread π
π£ Come work with us! The @wzb.bsky.social Center for Civil Society Research is looking for a research associate/doctoral candidate (75%) for a 3 year period, starting on Apr 1, 2026. The researcher will work in the Manifesto Project. More:
wzb.hr4you.org/job/view/428...
Apply by Jan 25, 2026! ποΈ
Thank you! :)
Our latest paper on party brands in Europe is outin @poppublicsphere.bsky.social! More to come as the brilliant @eborbath.bsky.social and I finalize a book manuscript that brings together insights on party names, action repertoires, organizational adaptations, and how voters respond to them.
On a personal note, this has been the paper I have worked on the most of everything I have published. I have learned a lot along the way as the paper matured. We are grateful to everyone who commented on various iterations.
We are currently writing a book on these topics, so stay tuned for more π
The paradox: name changes donβt buy much. In the experiments, party-name labels have tiny effects (a βmovementβ label is only ~+1pp vs no label). Voters react more to signals about how parties organize (e.g., ties to civil society) and they tend to punish established parties that rebrand.
Who drives this change? Mostly newer parties, parties on the right, and often parties in opposition, with the radical right especially prone to adopting βmovementβ-like branding. The shift is also stronger where party systems are more unstable (higher electoral volatility).
Big supply-side takeaway: since the 1960s, parties increasingly drop βpartyβ and classic ideology words. By the early 2020s, nearly 2/3 of parties no longer identify as βpartiesβ in their official name; βmovementβ references rise in waves (e.g., post-2008).
Demand side: we ran two conjoint survey experiments (2023) in Austria, Germany, Italy, and Hungary, one on branding of a new party, one on rebranding an existing party, to see whether βnonclassicalβ labels actually help.
Supply side: we built a ballot-paper party-name dataset by manually coding name changes across 616 parties, 28 European countries, between 1945-2023 (or from the first competitive election). This lets us track how party labels evolve across decades and party systems.
π New paper on party brands with @swenhutter.bsky.social in @poppublicsphere.bsky.social
We study the supply (how parties call themselves) and demand (what voters reward) sides. We pair a new European dataset of party names with conjoint experiments on voter reactions
OA π doi.org/10.1017/S153...
My wish for 2026 is that Europeans will be as critical and vigilant about authoritarianism and racism in their own country as they are about them in the U.S. and that Americans will be as critical and vigilant about authoritarianism and racism in the U.S. as Europeans are.
NOW OUT ON FIRSTVIEW!!
Brand Transformation in #European #Politics: The Rise and Limits of #Nonclassical #Names
By @eborbath.bsky.social & @swenhutter.bsky.social
doi.org/10.1017/S153...
This is a fantastic dataset for studying the evolution of political attitudes and party preferences in Germany.
Here's a mosaic plot of vote choices in 2025 by vote choices in 2021 (as reported back then).
One striking observation is the high volatility behind the overall gains of the Left Party.
This is a brilliant piece on the restructuring of political competition in Western Europe and goes far beyond the question of populism. Great also for teaching.
It is almost 10 years since Hanspeter Kriesi published his seminal article on the politicization of European Integration @jcms-eu.bsky.social.
A short thread on how things stand as of 2024, with @chesdata.bsky.social, looking at salience, clarity, and unity of party positions towards the EU π§΅:
Heute vor 4 Jahren ist der groΓe #Politikwissenschaft ler Klaus von #Beyme gestorben.
Wir gedenken seiner wieder mit einer Vorlesung an der @uniheidelberg.bsky.social, diesmal am 15. Januar, 18 Uhr in der Aula. Sprecherin: Prof. @andrearoemmele.bsky.social von der @hertieschool.bsky.social.