THANKS! And great timing. I teach my class on this next week. I was able to update my link to your website thanks to you.
21.03.2025 14:45
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THANKS! And great timing. I teach my class on this next week. I was able to update my link to your website thanks to you.
thatβs the wrong word
It's dramatic tho
Congrats! Very cool and well done paper
π¬
THREAD: In 2023, I received an envelope with no return address. Inside was a flash drive containing tens of 1000s of secret files.
It came from a vigilante with a tumultuous past, who'd conducted a years-long undercover operation. He didnβt tell the FBI or his family. He only told me.
Much more in the paper (linked)
I'm not at #ASSA2025 (new kids) but able and willing to connect otherwise!
11/11
This paper is an example of how nice it is to work with great coauthors AND how great peer review can be. (Weird? But true!) We got wonderful feedback from referees at the JFQA previously and our current editorial team, and these have materially improved the paper. We are very grateful.
10/
Policy implication: One-size-fits-all governance mandates can harm firms by forcing out directors with valuable firm-specific knowledge. More flexible approaches might better balance monitoring & advising roles.
Firms know this & recognize value of their dirs and so reclass when possible.
9/N
Mechanism: Reclassified directors had ~25% more board experience & were 60pp more likely to be former employees. When firms couldn't reclassify, new directors focused more on monitoring (20% more likely to join audit committees) vs advising.
8/N
Design insight: Previous work compared compliant vs non-compliant firms. This paper's triple-diff compares reclassifying vs non-reclassifying firms within the non-compliant group. Cleaner identification.
7/N
Key findings: Non-reclassifying firms saw ROA decline by 2.7pp vs reclassifiers.
Main channel? Labor efficiency. These firms had higher SG&A costs, lower sales/profits per employee, and their 10Ks discuss process innovation less -> π of op. expertise as knowledgeable directors depart π«
6/N
Reclassifying firms (R=1) became compliant with exchange independence quickly via this way (panel 2), even though ISS classifications of their directors remain least independent (panel 3).
Upshot: R firms are able to retain employee directors at much higher rate (panel 4)
5/N
Identification: Some firms could reclassify directors as "independent" (eg if they retired > 3 years ago) while others had to hire new outside directors. Reclassification eligibility was largely predetermined before mandates > quasi-random variation in compliance strategy that we can exploit.
4/N
Takeaways
1. Inside dir advice is performance relevant via oper. efficiency
2. Insiders <=/=> agency problems
3. Gov standards disregard pre-existing governance arrangements (which tradeoff monitor/advice)
4. Speaks to policy debates (eg the push for maximal independence)
3/N
Punchline: After the 2002 NYSE/NASDAQ board independence mandates, firms that replaced existing non-independent directors underperformed firms that retained these directors by reclassifying them as independent. Suggests valuable firm-specific knowledge was lost.
2/N
𧡠I'm happy to share an updated draft!
"Revisiting Board Independence Mandates: Evidence from Director Reclassifications" provides causal evidence on the effects of mandated board independence.
Joint with Jerome Taillard (@babsoncollege.bsky.social)
#ASSA2025 #EconSky #FinSky
1/N
@emollick.bsky.social I thought this little trick mighty be of interest
Can't wait for the @khoavuumn.bsky.social meme on this paper
Really cool work that raises questions about how we think about science and progress. The push towards pre registration has benefits but foregoing HARKing has many costs too. The optimal balance is not obvious!
Lesson: don't start your social media life during a hectic working lunch - I didn't change the author names in the first post π€£
Iβm very excited to now be able to follow this saga on main, now that Iβm not just a lurker. π€
My coauthors (@lukestein.com, McKay Price, and Ke Yang) and I were thrilled to find out our work βMeasuring and Mitigating Racial Disparities in LLM Mortgage Underwritingβ was recognized as the Best Paper at the (fantastic!) New Zealand Finance Meeting
acfr.aut.ac.nz/conferences-...
Thanks and apologies to @lukestein.com for the thread copy. Can't improve on this!
Thereβs more in the draft lukeste.in/llmmortgage
Obviously no one should (/would?π’) make critical financial decisions using prompts so simple. But genAI is getting deployed and importance of audits and intentional design are even more important in more complex systems!
Fin.
Somehow, just asking LLM to be unbiased
β’ Eliminates approval recommendation gap (on average and across different credit scores)
β’ Reduces average racial interest rate gap by about 60% (from 35bp to 14), with even larger effects for lower-credit-score Black applicants
8/
(Training data incl. long history of racial disparities in mortgages, plus prompts may trigger bias learned elsewhere)
We give access to explicit race information, which should make it easy to π’π·π°πͺπ₯ discrimination if LLMs can ignore it, as they know they shouldβ¦
7/
We find anti-Black bias in mortgage underwriting recommendations from a number of LLMs
Black borrowers with low credit scores suffer the most
6/
LLMβs mortgage racial bias biggest for applications with lower credit scores [or high DTI, high LTV]:
β’ The Blackβwhite approval rate gap is ~56% greater for low-score applicants than at average (13.3pp vs. 8.5)
β’ Interest rate gap ~32% greater (47bp vs. 35)
5/
LLMs recommend denying more loans and charging higher interest rates to Black applicants
They would, on average, need credit scores ~120 points higher than white applicants to receive the same approval rate; ~30 higher to get same interest rate
4/
