A pro-Kurdish demonstration in central London, complete with flags of Abdullah Öcalan, the YPG, the federated Iraqi region of Kurdistan – but not, as was so often the case in previous years, the PKK.
A pro-Kurdish demonstration in central London, complete with flags of Abdullah Öcalan, the YPG, the federated Iraqi region of Kurdistan – but not, as was so often the case in previous years, the PKK.
But it’s the justice role that will get the Kremlinologists speculating. Is Gürlek’s new job a reward for the cases he led in Istanbul, or an effort to put some distance between him and them?
Also gone tonight is the interior minister Ali Yerlikaya. Those close to the government are making much of the fact he is the first hafız – someone who can recite the Koran from memory – in the role.
It’s a remarkable appointment because of Gürlek’s links not only to the İmamoğlu case, but to countless others involving high profile broadcasters, actors’ agents, sporting club directors… The Istanbul chief prosecutor has not shied away from the limelight over the past year.
In a pretty stunning move, President Erdoğan has tonight appointed Istanbul’s chief prosecutor Akın Gürlek – the man who led many of the judicial cases against the opposition’s jailed presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu – as his new justice minister.
Plus there’s the fact the pre-1980 economy was much less open than today’s, and there are many who’d argue the Cyprus embargoes were just as destructive as mismanagement of the economy by domestic politicians, etc etc – but you already know all this! :)
Agree with all this. The original question was about inflation, which as you say isn’t enough to tip things. Turkey has had far worse inflation and for longer: my first ever salary was paid in billions of TL.
A massive fiscal crisis is another ball game altogether – but again, we’re not there yet.
Don’t have the figures to hand so happy to be corrected but surely inflation was far, far worse in the 80s and 90s than it was before the 1980 coup – when the bigger issue was political deadlock plus violence and lawlessness on the streets.
The past 40 years of Turkish elections shows chronic inflation doesn’t necessarily kill a party’s election prospects, so long as people have jobs or the right kind of handouts, and so long as there isn’t an obvious alternative.
Sırrı Süreyya Önder died this afternoon of multiple organ failure, after spending nearly three weeks critically ill in hospital following emergency heart surgery.
A huge loss for parliament, Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party – and the peace process.
You don't really need subtitles to see how well presenter Meltem Bozbeyoğlu handles the moment a 6.2 magnitude earthquake in Istanbul struck live on CNN Türk, but here they are in any case.
I am as shocked as you are.
Trying to sort one out. Substack is being tricky.
Today’s the Turkish parliament’s 105th anniversary.
Some, like independence war veteran Rauf Orbay below, believe this – and not 29 October 1923 – is Turkey’s true birthday. It was since then, he argues, that the country operated as a republic.
Either way, happy birthday 🇹🇷
Getting underway right now!
All this makes him perhaps the closest example that DEM can point to of an elder statesman – one who is now fighting for his life in hospital.
In the Turkish parliamentary system each of the main parties nominate a deputy speaker and chairs sessions in rotation. Önder is the man who represents the pro-Kurdish DEM.
Despite his party affiliation, he’s actually Turkish, even though he hails from the southeast of Turkey.
Typo. Should have been “pro-Kurdish”. Thanks
Sırrı Süreyya Önder, one of the most recognised pro-Kurdish politicians in Turkey and member of the delegation holding talks with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, has been rushed to hospital tonight with a suspected tear to a heart valve.
His party says his condition is serious.
It is.
Parliamentary arithmetic still matters.
A reminder that Turkey's governing party does not have a majority, and its de facto coalition does not wield a three-fifths majority in the Grand National Assembly.
You need the latter to change the constitution or call an early election.
The opposition says all this boils down to Erdoğan not wanting to face İmamoğlu in an election.
It’s not yet clear how many voters, and crucially what type of voters, agree with that.
The CHP’s challenge is to maintain momentum and channel public anger – and that won’t be easy.
Also, note posts like this by a senior pro-Kurdish MP implying Ankara mayor Mansur Yavaş, who has Turkish nationalist roots, is a fascist.
The row is about his view of a recent Kurdish rally.
It will be tough to keep an opposition alliance together.
It’s clear that a significant section of Turkish society is outraged at what’s going on. They aren’t all CHP supporters.
What is not yet clear is how deep the anger extends. How many religious conservatives, say, or Turkish nationalists think the same?
It is too early to say.
The justice minister says this is an independent judicial process and any suggestion of political influence is plainly wrong.
The opposition, and countless observers documenting an increasingly politicised judiciary in Turkey, tell a different story.
So: what happens next?
Most immediately, İmamoğlu will become CHP candidate for president. Party members will vote on Sunday, the result declared and the party will formalise the decision later in the week.
There is, of course, no election imminent.
The language is unusual because it is common legal practice for cases to be treated in isolation: it is highly irregular to declare a suspect is not being detained on one set of charges on the basis he is already being held on another set of charges.
On the second set of charges – relating to terrorism – he has been released pending further enquiries, even though there are "strong suspicions". In highly unusual language for a judicial document, the court decision points out he is already being held for the corruption charges.
The court decided to uphold İmamoğlu's arrest and detain him pending trial on the first set of charges – those containing allegations of fraud and corruption.
It means the suspended mayor of Istanbul will remain in prison for the foreseeable future.
Now that Ekrem İmamoğlu has been formally charged and he has been stripped – temporarily, we are told – of his Istanbul mayoralty, what happens next?
A thread 🧵