GEOPOLIST - Istanbul Center for Geopolitics

"...Last but not least, the weakening or end of wilayat al-faqih may not necessarily lead to a decline in Shiism itself. While it would indeed diminish one dominant political interpretation of Shiism,..."👇
geopolist.com/wilayat-al-f...

"This does not mean Pezeshkian has already replaced the doctrine. That would go beyond what the evidence supports. But it does mean that the war has opened a space in which the presidency can appear more necessary, more visible, and potentially more legitimate than the guardianship model itself..."👇

Wilayat al-Faqih Is Entering Its Final Chapter The war that began on February 28, 2026 is not only testing the military endurance of the Islamic Republic. It is testing the survivability of the doctrine that gave the republic its deepest claim to ...

Wilayat al-Faqih Is Entering Its Final Chapter geopolist.com/wilayat-al-f...

2-...particularly in the eyes of China and Russia.

1- The US is highly unlikely to retreat from a campaign it has set in motion without securing its principal objective: the dismantling of the regime in one form or another. Any outcome short of that would inflict serious strategic damage on Washington’s global standing,..👇

....during the Azerbaijan–Armenia conflict.

We may well see further provocations by Iran — or even false-flag operations by Israel or the US later attributed to Iran — aimed at Azerbaijan, or even at Turkey, with Ankara potentially being drawn in not as a direct combatant but as a strategic backer, much as it backed Baku during the...👇

b- Bandar Abbas would more likely be a secondary front. The recent furious statements by Ilham Aliyev after the drone attack give some indication of that possibility.

a- If the US were ever to launch such an invasion, the main front would likely be opened from the Azerbaijani side, given Tehran’s relative proximity to that frontier and the Turkic-populated corridor leading toward the capital, rather than from Bandar Abbas near the Strait of Hormuz.👇

c- ...it appears, and its army is far weaker than many expect. If a ground campaign begins—and it must be conducted without Kurdish support—what we may witness is not a prolonged Vietnam-style quagmire, but a collapse closer to Saddam’s army in 2003 or, more recently, Assad’s forces in Syria.

b- ...its enemies to argue that Iran could drag the US into a long, grinding conflict. That analogy is mistaken. The regime has been decaying from within for years: politically, institutionally, militarily, and socially. Its legitimacy is badly eroded, its coercive apparatus is more brittle than...

a- If the US starts a ground invasion of Iran, the outcome is more likely to resemble the rapid collapse of a hollowed-out regime than a “second Vietnam.” Iran was a paper tiger before this war began, and it remains. Yet some still invoke the Iran–Iraq War and Tehran’s firework show against ...

‘Russia Will Be Next’: Kremlin Propagandists Shocked by Operations Over Iran
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www.kyivpost.com/post/71145

CIA working to arm Kurdish forces to spark uprising in Iran, sources say
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www.cnn.com/2026/03/03/p...

The Collapse of the Regime in Iran Could Be Ankara’s Biggest Strategic Gain Since the Collapse of the USSR
geopolist.com/the-collapse...

6-...only this time with an added long-term lever: proximity to Iran’s Turkic populations and, by extension, a potential gateway influence line toward the wider Turkic space in Central Asia.

5-...morph into Kurd–Azeri (Iranian Turk) communal friction, because the terrain is demographically contested rather than cleanly Kurdish-majority. In that kind of chaos, Turkey—potentially alongside Azerbaijan—could justify a safe-zone/corridor logic reminiscent of previous theaters,...

4- We may be drifting toward a Syria-style endgame in Iran: external powers “activate” the Kurdish card, while Kurdish factions overestimate what they can secure beyond Kurdish-majority belts. If Kurdish armed units push into mixed provinces like West Azerbaijan, the conflict could quickly...

3- And if that internal dynamic cannot be cultivated, then Washington should own its stated objectives and bear the costs directly—rather than outsourcing the ground fight to proxies in a way that predictably consolidates the regime.

2-That can fracture the opposition and push fence-sitters—especially Iranian Turks—closer to the regime. If the objective is regime collapse from within, the smarter path is broad, internal, nationwide pressure.

1- Arming Kurdish forces to spark an uprising in Iran would be strategically self-defeating. It shifts the crisis from “regime vs. Iranian society” into “Iran vs. separatists and foreign-backed insurgents,” handing Tehran its strongest card: nationalist consolidation.

3-...A former spymaster understands this instinct better than anyone. When a partner becomes compromised, the first move in politics is not sentiment—it is distance, insulation, and narrative control..."

2-...If his Iranian networks are exposed, if Tehran looks shakier than the “won’t collapse” confidence he projected on Feb. 9, then proximity to Iran stops looking like strategic depth and starts looking like political contamination.

1- ...Fidan’s pivot reads less like a message to Tehran than a survival maneuver aimed at Ankara...Iran’s weakening—or even the possibility of regime fracture—creates a toxic problem for an official widely suspected as Tehran’s key intelligence-linked asset in Turkey... 👇

US troops were told war on Iran was ‘all part of God’s divine plan’, watchdog alleges www.theguardian.com/world/2026/m...

The collapse of the regime in Iran has started with Khamenei’s death—but it will accelerate with the succession of Mojtaba Khamenei. Pezeshkian has respected—and ultimately yielded to—Ali Khamenei’s personal authority; he is unlikely to extend that same automatic obedience to his son. 👇

He may have conveyed a similar message to Iran—suggesting that no immediate war or U.S. strike was imminent.
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"...On Feb. 9, during a live CNN Türk interview, Hakan Fidan insisted that “at least for now, there seems to be no immediate threat of war” between the U.S. and Iran..."

Such 'ambiguity' is typical of Hakan Fidan: as Turkey’s spymaster at the time, he met Mohamed Morsi roughly ten days before the July 3, 2013 military takeover—yet reassured him there was “nothing to worry about” and that no coup was imminent.👇

2- ...Fidan began emphasizing Iran’s vulnerabilities rather than its strength. He scolded Iran for failing to prepare its own intelligence and air defenses: “If you didn’t do your homework and build up your capabilities, you shouldn’t even be debating with Israel or America at that level,”

1- When asked (On Feb. 9) on camera if an American or Israeli bombing campaign might topple Tehran’s leadership, Fidan replied bluntly: “No, [it] will not [collapse]” and called the idea “an empty dream”. In a special TRT Haber broadcast on March 3,... 👇