Sir Humphrey

This is where good briefing is critical - how do you ensure a Minister understands their responsibility in a life & death situation, and do so in only 2 sides of A4?

This matters because it reminds us how much responsibility Ministers carry, and how finite their briefing and awareness is. Had a CT incident occurred the next day, this is all they'd have known going into COBR about their role.

And that was it - two pages in a much longer brief setting out to Ministers their new responsibility to authorise an SAS assault in the UK. Short and to the point, it provided a high level overview, but no tactical details on what would happen - it was a very strategic brief.

Wider plans existed to deploy troops to Heathrow and Gatwick airports under OP TRUSTEE and BLACK DIAMOND.

Both would have used regular troops and were tested routinely to understand the exercise and skills needed.

The role of the SBS was to respond to incidents on Oil Platforms (OP OILSAFE) and onboard ships (OP ORCADES). They could be used for THROWER "if the situation demands their special skills".

This showed a clear split between SAS & SBS in terms of operational roles.

If an incident occurred overseas, OP THROWER would happen. The Foreign Sec would chair COBR and authorise an SAS assault, while a Junior Minister would deploy to the country to manage the incident.

THROWER was tested by the SAS in Cyprus in 1979, 1981 and 1983.

Ministers were advised that MINSTREL was regularly exercised and tested. It was fully implemented during the Iranian Embassy siege in 1980, and SAS deployed during a hijack in Stansted in 1982. GASTRIC had not been implemented by 1983.

The Home Secretary would lead a MINSTREL response in COBR, and the NI Secretary would lead GASTRIC from the NI Ops Room in Belfast.

Responses were Police led "until Ministers authorise an assault by the SAS as the only way of resolving an incident".

Ministers were told that there was a permanent SAS team ready to conduct CT Operations in the UK. On the mainland this was known as OP MINSTREL, while in NI, it was OP GASTRIC.

It is June 1983, you have just been elected to Parliament and appointed a Minister in the MOD. Your staff provide you with an induction briefing pack, including a section on Counter Terrorism. This is the actual brief Ministers had on the role of the SAS & SBS in CT operations.

I'll see if I get time to post it here - I basically repeat the same content, but its time consuming to cross post to both, hence irregular posts here as X has vastly more reach and impact than this account does.

Within a short time U2 flights, Satellites and other assets would improve the ability to glean imagery, report ship movements and spot ships in refit. Less than 25 years later US files show they had huge understanding of every stage of construction about Soviet SSBNs.

The rest of the report is classified, but its a great reminder of how HUMINT reporting providing invaluable building block intelligence in the early days of the Cold War. We will never know who risked it all to make these notes and debrief them to the CIA, but we owe them.

The sketch therefore is a vital note showing what an asset could recall. Its a helpful diagram that would have verbally confirmed to analysts the type of ships likely to be in harbour, reconfirming known ORBATS and potentially helping give new information out on the submarine.

The report also noted that the amount of activity seemed unusual, but provided helpful descriptions of the vessels, their appearance, paint scheme and so on. This sort of information was impossible to glean from SIGINT.

The dates are redacted, but it also provides timely advice on ship movements (or lack of), which could be used to infer information on the readiness of ships for operations. Notable too were comments on the SVERDLOV - her name has been redacted for reasons unknown!

Other information commented on ships in refit, helping note about unusual features. This could be used to corroborate other reports, and also advise on new features or refit activity. This was again invaluable for naval analysts looking at the Baltic fleet.

This is helpful as it confirms ship locations, and also the presence of older capital ships. "October Revolution" dated back to 1915, had fought in WW2 (where she was awarded the Order of the Red Banner) and was then awaiting disposal.

The report then states ships seen in Krondstadt harbour, near Leningrad. This included cruisers, and the ancient Gangut class battleship "October Revolution" as well as submarines in the basin.

Thankfully Western intelligence had a range of different sources to report information. In this case, a CIA source, probably onboard a ship in the Baltic reported in early 1955 seeing three cruisers on a Westerly course near Norway.

Of particular concerns was the Sverdlov class cruiser. Well armed with 6" guns and a global range, it was a potent threat to NATO reinforcement convoys and merchant shipping in the Atlantic.

After the Cold War began, travel into the Soviet Union became challenging. The Baltic was, in parts, a closed lake. With limited aerial imagery available, it was hard to get good coverage of what the Soviet Navy was up to in the Baltic area.

This may look like a child's drawing of warships, but in fact it is a SECRET 1955 CIA HUMINT report on Soviet naval vessels in the Baltic.

PSL thread analysing a forgotten report to show value of Cold War HUMINT sources for analysis and intelligence.

I tend to not post very often on Bluesky as I find a lot of people here are rather prickly. I'm going to give it another go and try cross posting some of my X threads, and host them here too, and see what the response is like though.

Overall this visit was a huge success, opening the doors to cooperation at a crucial time in the bilateral links between the two navies. Sadly these links were not to endure. Makarov retired in 1992 - today a Russian warship bears his name.

Despite this 1SL was careful to sound suitably apologetic for his behaviour, signing off in the manner of a chastened junior officer!

It was noted that a short visit to an RN submarine by a submarine Admiral went down very well indeed. The mood music changed on the visit and resulted in the offer to visit any Soviet submarine - an incredible opportunity.

He went on to note that USN seniors were now visiting Soviet submarines, so this was not unusual. Additionally the visit occurred due to a programme gap when Makarov suggested not giving his speech again (to the delight of the RN!).

1SL noted that during the Yazov visit, an SSBN visit had been mooted, but "discarded on grounds of taste" as well as practicality. He had no recollection of opposing an SSN visit as suggested by the SofS. (a polite way of suggesting the Minister was lying?)

1SL responded with a personal note to SofS setting out his reasons for the visit. It is incredibly unusual to find a 4* Officer sending a personal 'reasons in writing' letter like this, making it of real historical value.